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THE COMPLAINT IN CODE PLEADING1
CHARLES E. CLARK
PLEADING FACTS
One of the most important changes of the New York Code of
Pleading and Practice of 1848, so at least the code makers be-
lieved, was to be found in the requirement that there should be
stated "in ordinary and concise language" the facts constituting
each cause of action or defense. It is true that the common law
declaration contained allegations which set forth the pleader's
cause in a general way at least; but the emphasis under the com-
mon law system of pleading was placed, not so much on getting
the facts on record, but rather upon forcing the opposing parties
by their successive pleadings to arrive at a single definite issue.
In accordance with the natural tendency of all procedural proc-
esses towards standardization and formalism, common law plead-
ing had come in large measure to consist of formal general state-
ments which did not set forth the details of the pleader's case.
The codifiers considered this to be a real and serious defect, and
they termed their cure for it "the key of the reform" they were
advocating.- Elsewhere in their code they adapted the existing
equity practice to their purpose. In equity pleading very great
detail of the kind termed "evidence" was incorporated in the
pleadings, due in part to the rules whereby the plaintiff might
force the defendant to a discovery of his proof in his answer, and
in part to the general requirement of equity that all the evidence
must be made a matter of record. The codifiers concluded that
for the blended system they proposed, the evidential facts should
IThis article with some modifications and additions will appear as a
chapter on The Complaint in a book on Code Pleading to be published by
the West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota. The writer aclmowl-
edges special indebtedness to his colleague, Professor Walter Wheeler Cook,
for suggestions as to the nature of facts.
2 First Report of Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings, N. Y. 1S48,
sec. 118, note, at 137-147.
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be omitted, the ultimate facts, rather than the legal conclusions,
should be stated, and the pleadings should not go on until a
single formal issue was reached, but should terminate in any
event with the reply.3
Law, Facts and Evidence Distinguished
Apparently the codifiers considered the distinction between
law, facts and evidence to be more easily drawn than has proved
to be the case. It should be noted, however, that they did not so
much overemphasize the distinction as has been done in the later
code pleading. They laid stress also on the use of "ordinary and
concise language, without repetition, and in such a manner as
to enable a person of common understanding to know what was
intended." 4 And they said: "It will hardly be possible to re-
duce questions to all their elements before trial. What ultimate
questions may arise, cannot be known till the evidence is dis-
closed. The most skillful pleading will lead only to an approxi-
mation greater or less according to the nature of the original
questions." I But at any rate their ideal of pleading facts, as it
has been worked out, has proven probably the most unsatisfactory
part of their reform.0 This is due in part to the fact that the
distinction, if existent at all, is not clear cut and obvious, in
part to the attempt to apply rigid rules to a matter where flex-
ibility is a necessity, and in part to the inherent difficulties of the
problem. For here we have theheart of all pleading difficulties.
The pleader himself may not know his case before the evidence
is produced; and if he does, he will hardly desire to give it away
in advance.7 His opponent, and to a certain extent at least the
court, will naturally wish to tie him down to a definite declara-
3 Ibid. at 141, 142.
4Ibid. sec. 120; N. Y. Laws, 1848, ch. 379, see. 120: "The complaint
shall contain: . . . 2. A statement of the facts constituting the
cause of action, in ordinary and concise language without repetition, and
in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to
know wliat is intended." Similar expressions were made as to the answer
and the reply. Ibid. sec. 128, 131. For the modern somewhat abbreviated
version, see N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, see. 255.
5 First Report, 144.
G See Works, Juridical Reform (1919) 45: Pound, Boox Raviaws (1919)
33 HARv. L. Rav. 326; Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading under tho Codes
(1921) 21 COL. L. REV. 416; COMMENTS (1923) 32 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 483;
Sims, The Problem of Reforming Procedure (1912) 21 ibid. 215, citing 13
Enc. Brit., 9th ed. 763; Sunderland, The Michigan Judicature Act of 1916
(1916) 14 MIH. L. REv. 441, 551; NOTE AND COMMENT (1910) 8 Micui. L.
REV. 400; Costigan, The Spirit of Code Pleading (1917) 11 ILL. L. REV. 517.
IFirst Report, 141: " . . . There has been a constant struggle of the
pleaders and the courts, to evade their own rules. They made them and they
defend them as the means of eliciting the precise point in dispute, and they
seek every means in their power, to conceal it under the most general
allegations."
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tion before trial. Absolutely to reconcile these two opposing
positions is impossible; all the court can do is to attempt a reason-
able middle ground between them.
Later code provisions have tended even more to emphasize the
pleading of facts, and to omit the leavening admonition that
ordinarily understandable language must be used." Often now
the emphasis is placed on the material facts. The distinction
has been dwelt upon by text writers, especially by Pomeroy, wvho
stated in a well lnown phrase that it was the "dry naked actual
facts" which were to be pleaded.'" And the result has been cases
almost without number upon the point.,, It is quite common that
an allegation should be held bad as being a statement of law
only. 2 The stating of evidence, while subject to criticism, is
8 A usual form of expression is that of the "plain and concise statement"
of the New York Code, N. Y. C. C. P. sec. 481; ef. N. Y. C. P. A. 1921,
sec. 241. See also the following; "A statement of the facts constituting
the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language." Calif. C. C. P. 1923,
see. 426. For substantially the original New York provision see the
Indiana statute, Burn's Ann. Sts. 1914, sec. 343, and Jaemcs V. State Life
hus. Co. (1925, Ind.) 147 N. E. 533. Indiana has probably, however, been
as strict as any state in its requirement of detailed allegations. The prac-
tice has been somewhat modified by statute. See CommmEN-Ts (1923) 32
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 484, 486; infra note 12.
9 English Judicature Act, 0. 19, r. 4: "Every pleading shall contain,
and contain only, a statement in a summary form of the material facts
on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case
may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved, . . ."
N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, sec. 241: "Every pleading shall contain a plain and
concise statement of the material facts, without unnecessary repetition,
on which the party pleading relies, but not the evidence by which they
are to be proved." N. J. P. A. [1912, am'd 1913, r. 17 (a) ] requires a
statement of the "issuable" facts. In 1904 the New York legislature re-
quired "a plain, precise and unequivocal statement", but the former
language was restored in 1905. Note to N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, see. 241. Cf.
Conn. Gen. Sts. 1918, sec. 5637: "All pleadings shall contain a plain and
concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies, but
not of the evidence by which they are to be proved"; Conn. Prac. Bk. (1922)
283, sec. 181: "Acts and contracts may be stated according to their legal
effect, but in so doing the pleading should be such as fairly to apprize the
adverse party of the state of facts which it is intended to prove." In
connection with the provision that failure by the defendant to deny a
material allegation is an admission of its truth, the codes often define a
material allegation as one essential to the claim and which could not be
stricken from the pleading without leaving it insufficient-a definition not
helpful here.
20 Pomeroy, Code Remedies (4th ed. 1904) 560, 561. Cf. 1tiscr ,. Mw,-
ser (1920) 281 Mo. 649, 221 S. W. 46 that the ultimate facts to be pleaded
"are nothing more than issuable, constitutive, or traversable facts es-
sential to the statement of the cause of action," (holding a statement of
the law of a foreign state to be a mere legal conclusion),
"M Many of these cases are collected in the Am. Dig., Plcading, sec. 3,
pars. 1-22. For cases on the improper pleading of evidence, see ibid. sec. 11.
22 An interesting illustration on which the courts have divided is the
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not so often held to render the pleading bad, since the court itself
will draw the ultimate conclusion where it is the one necessarily
following from the allegations made.13
A few examples may serve to make the problem clearer. Thus
an allegation that one who is actually an assignee of a bond sues
as "holder" thereof is held insufficient as an allegation of law
only.14 An allegation that one is "entitled" to possession of
specific property is open to the same objection. 15 On the other
hand, the allegation that one is the owner of and entitled to the
possession of property sufficiently alleges a fact." But allega-
question whether it is a sufficient allegation of consideration of a contract
to say that there was a "valuable consideration." See note 25, infra. In
Grossman v. Schenker (1912) 206 N. Y. 466, 100 N. E. 39, that it was
"mutually agreed" is held an allegation of fact. So also in Fisher, Brown
& Co. v. Fielding (1895) 67 Conn. 91, 103, 34 Atl. 714, of the allegation
that a foreign court "duly adjudged" that the defendant should pay a
certain sum of money. By statute now in Indiana, "all conclusions stated"
must be held allegations of fact unless attacked by motion. Ind. Acts 1913,
ch. 322, sec. 1, am'd 1915, ch. 62, sec. 1. See COMMENTS, 100. cit. supra
note 8.
13 That evidential matter should rarely be stricken, see Hoff v. Kauffman
(1925, Pa.) 128 Atl. 120; Donovan v. Davis (1912) 85 Conn. 394, 82 Atl.
1025; cf. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Cities Service Co. (1920, D. C. Del.) 270
Fed. 994. Where the "necessary" inference from the facts stated is that
which will sustain the action, the complaint is not demurrable. Illinois
Steel Co. v. Ostrowski (1902) 194 Ill. 376, 62 N. E. 822; Am. Dig., supra
note 11, see. 9. This inference must, however, be a "necessary" one, from
the facts alleged, i.e. a reasonably obvious one, apparently. Do Cordova v.
Sanville (1915) 214 N. Y. 662, 108 N. E. 1092, reversing (1914, 1st Dept.)
165 App. Div. 128, 150 N. Y. Supp. 709, on the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Ingraham below (action for a loan; the possibility of a gift or
other transfer of the money was not negatived by the allegations). Of.
MeCaughey v. Schuette (1896) 117 Calif. 223, 46 Pac. 666 and Rcichcr v.
Trade Bank (1924, Sup. Ct.) 124 Misc. 166, 207 N. Y. Supp. 179; infra note
33. In Kellog v. Berkshire Bldg. Corp. (1925, Sup. Ct.) 211 N. Y. Supp.
623, an affidavit in support of a motion for summary judgment failed be-
cause it stated the ultimate and not the evidentiary facts ("that by reason
of the failure of the defendant to show title to the aforesaid premises free
from material defect, the said loan was not consummated").
14 Smith v. Dean (1853) 19 Mo. 63. But see Trembath v. Berner (1925,
N. Y.) 148 N. E. 729. Cf. Laing v. Hudgens (1913, Sup. Ct.) 82 Misc. 388,
143 N. Y. Supp. 763. An allegation that the bond was "assigned" or
"transferred" *to the plaintiff would seem sufficient. Holland v. Grote
(1908) 193 N. Y. 262, 266, 86 N. E. 30; 1 Bradbury, Forms of Pleading
(1917) 102; Conn. Prac. Bk. (1922) 361; Bullen & Leake, Precedents of
Pleadings (7th ed. 1915) 64. Cf. Kelley v. Kelley (1913) 9 Ala. App. 306,
63 So. 740.
"rSheridan v. Jackson (1878) 72 N. Y. 170; infra, note 34; of. Scofield
v. Whitelegge (1872) 49 N. Y. 259; Saalberg v. Cellofilm Corp. (1924, Sup.
Ct.) 203 N. Y. Supp. 104 (that profits earned "entitled" P to the sum de-
manded is a mere conclusion).
16 Payne v. Treadwell (1860) 16 Calif. 221; Farmers' Bank v. Davis
(1919) 93 Or. 655, 665, 184 Pac. 275; George Adams & Frederick Co. v,
South Omaha Nat. Bank (1903, C. C. A. 8th) 123 Fed. 641; Pace v. Cran-
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tions that defendants made an agreement to convey realty to the
plaintiff, that defendants delivered their deed of grant to the
plaintiff and that the defendants now refuse to deliver possession
were held merely evidentiary in a suit for possession, since the
ultimate fact of ownership and right to possession was not
stated.'- The same court has held that an allegation of insol-
vency is an allegation of fact,"' while an allegation of insurable
interest is an allegation of a conclusion of law.19 Another able
court criticized counsel for not appreciating that a finding of a
transfer as in fraud of creditors was a finding of fact not to be
retried on appeal,*" while at the same time it held the contrary
of a finding of capacity (mentality) to make a gift.21 Allega-
tions that the plaintiff is a corporation, -2 that the defendant re-
ceived the money from the plaintiff in trust for certain purposes,-'
that defendant "became indebted" to plaintiff and "executed to
him a mortgage" " have all been held conclusions of law. There
is a conflict in the cases over the nature of the allegation "for a
valuable consideration." =5 The same is true of the allegation
dell (1905) 74 Ark. 417, 86 S. W. 812. Cf. Mason v. Mason (190) 219
Ill. 609, 76 N. E. 692. See Am. Dig., supra note 11, see. 8 (11).
17 McCaughey v. Sehuette, supra note 13, criticized note 33, infra. See also
Reicher v. Trade Bank, supra note 13.
18 State v. Neff (1881) 74 Ind. 146; Chicago, aad S. E. Ry. V. Kency
(1901) 159 Ind. 72, 62 N. E. 26.
19Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Sefton (1876) 53 Ind. 380; American, Mz.ut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Mead (1906) 39 Ind. App. 215, 79 N. E. 526. Cf. Pena
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wiler (1885) 100 Ind. 92 ("near relative").
2o Hinw v. McNerney (1922) 97 Conn. 303, 116 AtL 610. The question on
appeal of reviewing facts, not law, is similar to the pleading problem here
under discussion.
21 Farley v. Fitzsimmons (1922) 97 Conn. 372, 116 Atl. 600. Cf. Hula-
phrey v. Mottier and Haris (1911) 48 Ind. App. 469, 96 N. E. 38; Rigga
v. Aierican Tract Society (1881) 84 N. Y. 330; Physio-Medical College v.
Wilkinson (1886) 108 Ind. 314, 9 N. E. 167.
22 Brook-sville R. R. v. Byron (1899) 20 Ky. Law, 1041, 50 S. W. 530.
Cf. E. T. Bur'owes Co. v. Rapid Safety Filter Co. (190) 49 Misc 539, 07
N. Y. Supp. 1048; Baumz v. Stephenson (1908) 133 Mo. App. 187, 113 S.
W. 225 (partnership). But see N. Y. C. C. P., sec. 1775; N. Y. Rules Civ.
Prac. r. 93, and cases thereunder.
23 Franwis v. Gisbo'n (1905) 30 Utah, 67, 83 Pac. 571; Alex.ander v.
Fidelity Trust Co. (1914, E. D. Pa.) 215 Fed. 791; Metropolitan Trust Co.
v. Columbus S. and H. R. R. (1899, C. C. S. D. Ohio) 93 Fed. 689, 692.
2-4 Cooper v. McKee (1905) 121 Ky. 287, 89 S. W. 203. Cf. Sampson v.
Grand Rapids S. F. Co. (1900, 3d Dept.) 55 App. Div. 163, 66 N. Y. Supp.
815; Nealis v. Marks (1905, Sup. Ct.) 96 N. Y. Supp. 740; Sparks v. Ducas
(1908, 1st Dept.) 123 App. Div. 507, 108 N. Y. Supp. 546. Cf. I7,in V.
Insurance Co. of N. A. (1911) 16 Calif. App. 143, 116 Pac. 294; contra:
Gillespie v. Page (1910) 87 S. C. 82, 68 S. E. 1044; cases in Am. Dig., supra
note 11, sec. 8 (5). Cf. also Hussey v. Smith (1875) 1 Utah, 241.
23 See Cook, supra note 6, referring to the conflict in the lower New York
courts settled by California Packizg Corp. v. Kelly (1920) 228 N. Y. 49,
126 N. E. 269, holding the allegation to be a statement of facL See also
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that a person is an "heir" of an owner.28 Examples of a similar
nature can easily be multiplied.27
The Distinction One of Degree Only
On the other hand, text writers more recently have pointed out
the illusory nature of the distinction between facts, law and evi-
dence. 28  The ultimate facts are supposed to be somewhere be-
tween the law and the evidence. But facts do not easily di8en-
tangle themselves from conclusions or from details. The pleader
is attempting to restate or reconstruct past happenings, and, like
individuals generally, he may be garrulous or he may be taciturn,
he may be talkative or he may be reticent. That is to say, he
may put in all the details and thus give "evidence"; or he may
state only broad conclusions and pass final judgments of guilt or
error, and thus plead "law". Our real problem is, how specific
must the pleader be? And when the issue is one of variance be-
tween pleading and proof, how far may he shift his position after
he has chosen one?
It should further be noted that the attempted distinction be-
tween facts, law and evidence, viewed as anything other than a
convenient distinction of degree, seems philosophically and
logically unsound. We thinks of "facts" as things definite and
concrete, as representations of past events now a part of history
and thus fixed and unchangeable. Actually the stating of facts
involves a mental process of selecting from among observed
phenomena those which are important in view of our partieular
purpose, and interpreting them in the light of that purpose. 9
Brennan v. Standard Wood Heel Co. (1925, Sup. Ct.) 211 N. Y. Supp. 649,
Contra: Leach v. Rhodes (1874) 49 Ind. 291. See cases collected in Am.
Dig., supra note 11, see. 8 (4).
26 Statement of fact: Dibble v. Winter (1910) 247 Ill. 243, 248, 93 N.
E. 145; Physio-Medical College v. Wilkinson, supra note 21; Ricknor I%.
Clabber (1903) 4 Ind. T. 660, 76 S. W. 271. Statement of law: Stephatti
v. Stephani (1894) 75 Hun, 188, 26 N. Y. Supp. 1039; Reiners 'v. Brand-
horst (1879, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 59 How. Prac. 91; Cohen v. Doran (1909) 58
Fla. 418, 51 So. 282; Long v. Dufur (1911) 58 Or. 162, 113 Pac. 59; Heaton
v. Buhler (1910) 60 Tex. Civ. App. 423, 127 S. W. 1078; Combs v. Cardwell
(1915) 164 Ky. 542, 175 S. W. 1009. Compare Montz v. Schwabacher
(1904) 119 Ky. 256, 83 S. W. 569, with Craig v. Welch-Hackley Coal &
Oil Co. (1903) 25 Ky. Law, 232, 73 S. W. 1035, 74 S. W. 1097. See Am.
Dig., supra note 11, sec. 8 (14).
27 See general references, supra note 11.
28 Cook, supra note 6; Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1923)
32, 33; Isaacs, The Law and the Facts (1922) 22 Cot.. L. REV. 1; COM-
MENTS, op. cit. supra note 8. Cf. Cunningham, Textbook of Logic (1924)
ch. 19.
29 Cf. Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 28, The Hypothesis: e.g. at 239,
distinguishing between fact, hypothesis, theory and law; ". . . what
we call a fact is after all an hypothesis so generally accepted that no one
questions it"; at 247, ". . . facts do not speak for themselves . . .
264
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The selection of such data, with reference say to an automobile
accident, as made by a lawyer would differ from that made by a
newspaper reporter or a doctor. Now the lawyer's selection is
obviously made to back up some legal theory. In a certain view,
therefore, the lawyer is foolish if he tries to state anything but
law, i. e., to select the data to show that his client should recover.
To criticize him for doing this by saying that he is stating legal
conclusions is beside the point. What we really are saying is,
either that he ought to give us more data, i. e., his allegations are
too general, or that the data which he has selected proceeding on
one theory are too dissimilar to be available for another theory he
wishes later to advance, i. e., that there is a variance between
pleading and proof.
If we take as our test the requirement of fair notice of the
pleader's cause,30 it must follow that our solution should vary
with the case presented. A statement, to be condemned as a con-
clusion of law on one occasion, may be an operative fact or an
evidential fact on another. To take a common and striking ex-
ample, the statement that B is "the wife of A" is an ordinary way
of reporting what seems to the speaker to be a fact. Obviously
it involves a legal conclusion, often the decision of exceedingly
intricate legal problems.3' Where A, and B, his wife, having been
injured in the same accident, are each suing for damages, the
marriage is unimportant; but this would not be true, if, as is still
law in many jurisdictions, A has an action for loss of services of
his wife. If A and B are in divorce proceedings, the marriage
is a necessary event in the chain leading to the judgment of
divorce; and if B is claiming a share of A's estate as his "common
law" wife, the question of marriage is a conclusion to be drawn
by the judicial tribunal from facts presented to it. The partic-
ularity of allegation should vary with the question at issue.
The same general principle should govern the question of var-
iance between pleading and proof. The data selected and in-
terpreted to back up one theory of recovery may be so unlike the
data to back up another theory that the shift seems unfair to
the opponent. As pointed out later, however, in discussing the
necessity of a "theory of the pleadings", it must be borne in
the facts speak the language that our interests, quickened by a fertile
imagination and enriched by intimate contact, bring to them."
3o For a discussion of modern views of the functions of pleading, cce
Clark, Hist y, Systc;ns and Functio-v. of Peadi g (1925) 11 VA. L. R-v.
517, 542-4, pointing out the present emphasis upon the notice function-
notice of each material fact of the pleader's cause, rather than merely
general notice of the case, as in the so-called "notice pleading" referred
to below.
^1 Jessel. al. R., in Eaglesfield v. Marquis of Londondcrig (1876) L. . 4
Ch. Div. 693, 702, discussed by Cook, supra note G. Cf. as to heirAhip,
note 26.
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mind that the pleader's ultimate theory is that his client should
have judgment in his favor, that these others are but subordin-
ate theories to that end, and that a shift in merely the subordinate
theory when the main theory is known will perhaps rarely be an
unfair surprise to the defendant.32
It should also follow that considerable latitude should be al-
lowed the pleader. Rarely should a pleading be condemned for
being over-specific; and then the objection should be considered
one of form merely-undue verbosity, repetition, etc.-tather
than one of substance.33  On the other hand, generalities of alle-
gation should not be objectionable in themselves so long as rea-
sonably fair notice of the pleader's cause of action is given. The
matter should be one within the fair discretion of the trial court
in most cases. No rule of thumb is possible; but in general it
may be said that the pleader should not content himself with
alleging merely the final and ultimate conclusion which the court
is to make in deciding the case for him. He should go at least
one step further back and allege the circumstances from which
this conclusion directly followed.2 4
Since the question whether the complaint fairly gives notice
is one so largely dependent on particular facts and circumstances,
it is possible by examples merely to suggest the method of ap-
proach rather than to point to definite rules. There are, of
32 See discussion, infra.
33 It seems possible to distinguish-as the cases apparently do not-
between specific detailed allegations and evidential allegations; the latter
being of facts which render the specific facts highly probable under the cir-
cumstances and thus justify the trier of facts in concluding that the specific
facts exist. Thus in Reicher v. Trade Bank, supra note 13, a suit against
a bank for failure to honor the plaintiff's check, an allegation that the
defendant notified the plaintiff of the deposit of funds to his credit was
merely evidence that it actually did have the funds. Perhaps, in view of
the desirability of tying both parties down to the essential issue in the
case, which is not the bank's admission, but whether it actually had the
funds, it may be proper to consider such a form of pleading undesirable.
On the other hand, in McCaughey v. Schuette, supra note 13, the plaintiff
set up in detail certain facts showing a conveyance of land to him, and
sought possession of the land. The court held the complaint bad as show-
ing the evidentiary facts, but not the ultimate facts of ownership or right
to possession. But did he not show just that aggregate of facts-in de-
tail-which the law recognizes as giving a right to possession? That is,
he stated the real issue and the parties may profit by the detail which he
used. Even in the first instance, where the conclusion from the evidentiary
facts is the "necessary" one (i.e. a reasonably obvious one, see note 13
supra) it is perhaps doubtful whether an attempt by the court to pin the
parties down closer to the issue is worth while.
34 Thus in Sheridan v. Jackson, supra note 15, a suit for rents and profits
of realty, the plaintiff alleged that on a certain date he was "entitled to
the possession of, and the rents, issues and profits" of the realty. This was
held a conclusion and the complaint defective since "It does not allege that
he owned or ever possessed the premises, or that he owned the rents."
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course, certain more or less standardized cases. Perhaps as
illustrative a situation as any, is that of pleading negligence,
where the courts have differed markedly as to their conceptions
of fair notice of the pleader's case.25 A few special cases may
be referred to, merely by way of example. In an action against
a city the plaintiff alleged that the city had allowed a certain
street to get out of repair so that there existed in it a large hole
in the paving, that she was riding her bicycle on the street, and
having no knowledge of the defect in the street and not seeing it,
she "struck said defective, unsafe, and out of repair street, and
by reason of said street being out of repair as aforesaid, defective
and unsafe, she was thrown violently from her bicycle upon the
brick pavement of said street," etc. The court on appeal held
the pleading bad since it did not show that it was the defect in
the street which caused the fall. In other words, she struck the
defective street, but not necessarily the defect in the street.-' It
would seem but a reasonable construction to hold that it was the
hole in the street which the plaintiff struck; but even beyond
that, if she was thrown in trying to avoid the accident, it would
seem that the court and the defendant are given sufficient general
notice of the nature of the accident and that the particular de-
tails asked for by the court are not necessary at the pleading
stage of the trial. Again a plaintiff alleged that between certain
dates his assignor "performed certain labor for and on behalf of
the defendant, and furnished to the employees of the defendant,
at defendant's special instance and request, certain board,
food, and lodging, and goods, wares, and merchandise" of a
specified value. This was held fatally defective, although had
the allegations been that the assignor, "at the defendant's re-
quest, performed certain labor for the defendant and furnished
him certain board," etc., it would have been sufficient.37 The
:7 See the writer's comment, op. cit. supra note 8, passhm; also (1924)
33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 559.
36 City of Logansport v. Khin (1902) 159 Ind. 68, 64 N. E. 595; "It does
not appear that the appelee 'struck' the street at or near the defective part
thereof, nor that her bicycle struck the dangerous cavity, nor that it ran
into or across the hole, nor that the hole in the street had any connec-
tion whatever with the accident. . . The averment 'that, by reason
of the street being out of repair, she was thrown from her bicycle' leaves
the cause of the accident entirely to conjecture. Was she attempting to
guide her bicycle around the obstruction? Or did she stop it suddenly
to avoid running into it? Did she ride into the defective place in the
street, and did the fall or obstruction cause the bicycle to turn over? Or
did she attempt to leap from the wheel when she found she could not steer
it around the dangerous spot? None of these questions is answered by
the first paragraph of the complaint." Cf. Cox,=NTs, loc. cit. Gupra
note 8.
3 Conrad National Bank v. Great Northern Ry. (1900) 24 Mont. 178,
61 Pac. 1. The court's reasoning is that the labor is not alleged to have
been furnished at the request of the defendant, due to the position of the
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difference between the two from the standpoint of fair notice
seems inconsiderable. A man sued his former fiancee claiming
that "conditionally upon the defendant's fulfillment of her said
promise to marry" him, he gave her certain jewelry, which she
now refuses to return to him, although she has repudiated her
promise to marry him. The court held that the complaint was
defective, since it failed to show that the defendant knew of the
condition, or agreed to return the jewelry if she failed to marry
him. Since a gift is a bi-party transaction, it would seem that
the dissenting judges were justified in their view that "the ulti-
mate fact of conditional gift" was sufficiently pleaded38 Surely
the defendant had fair notice of the plaintiff's claim. In all these
and similar cases the court is viewing the allegations from an
attempted standard of strict and logical accuracy, and not from
the more practical one whether the facts upon which the plain-
tiff plans to rely are actually set forth with reasonable clearness,
Reference may also be made to the case of Jackson v. Strong,,°
where the plaintiff had counted on a contract as showing a part-
nership relation and the defendant had relied on the same con-
tract as showing a relation of employer and employee. Since
the defendant's view was held correct, the plaintiff's complaint
was in effect considered insufficient. The writer has critized
this view on the ground that notice only of the facts of the con-
tract, not its legal interpretation, was required. This indicates
how the present problem is connected with our fundamental views
as to the union of law and equity and the abolition of forms of
action. 40
Stating the Defendant's Duty and His Breach Thereof
The statement made above that the pleader in alleging his
facts should go at least one step further back than the conclusion
which he asks the court to draw in his favor will be a little
clearer upon reference to an analysis made elsewhere. A law-
suit is brought to enforce a right in the plaintiff and a duty in
the defendant. In the usual case we have here a remedial right
clause in the sentence, and hence no responsibility is shown for that portion
of the demand; and as to the board, etc., this was furnished to third parties
at defendant's request, and here no promise to pay is inferred from the
mere request.
3SRosenberg v. Lewis (1924, 1st. Dept.) 210 App. Div. 690, 206 N. Y,
Supp. 353, criticized in (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 237. This case may perhaps
be compared with Reicher v. Trade Bank, supra notes 13, 33, where there was
a real failure to allege anything but evidentiary facts. Even there, how-
ever, the conclusion from such facts seems so reasonably obvious that the
decision may, perhaps, be questioned.
39 Jackson v. Strong (1917) 222 N. Y. 149, 118 N. E. 512.
40 For a general discussion, see Clark, The Union of Law and Equity
(1925) 25 Co L. L. RBv. 1.
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as distinguished from a so-called primary right, the breach of
which has led to the remedial right. Thus, in an ordinary action
for breach of contract it is said that after the making of the
contract the plaintiff has a contractual right to the defendant's
performance of this promise, and the defendant a duty thereto.
Upon breach by the defendant of his duty in this respect, there
then arises a remedial right in the plaintiff to damages.-  Such
analysis of a cause is not possible in every case, as, for example,
in a suit for partition, or to probate a will. Except for these
more or less unusual cases, it can be made and is helpful. In
pleading the cause it would generally not be sufficient to state
the final right-duty relationship which is enforced in the action,
that is, the remedial rights and duties. It would be necessary
to state the facts showing the original primary right and the
defendant's breach, and leave it to the court to draw the ultimate
conclusion that the remedial duty is owed. Hence, it is quite
usual to find in the cases statements that it is necessary for the
pleader to set forth facts showing the plaintiff's substantive
right, the defendant's breach thereof, and the resulting damage
to the plaintiff.4 -2
Stating the Can.sal Coancctloii
Where the defendant's act or omission is not the only operative
fact to give rise to the remedial right-duty relation, but the fur-
ther fact of damage to the plaintiff is a necessary element, it is
important to show the causal connection between the defendant's
act or omission and the resulting damage. This is strildngly
illustrated in negligence cases. It is a common occurrence for
pleaders to state the defendant's act or omission and the damage
to the plaintiff without alleging directly that the latter resulted
from the former. Thus, in the case above discussed, where a
4 See Hohfeld, supra note 28, at 36-38; Corbin, Legal AnOZIyas anud Tciin-
inology (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 163, 167; Corbin, Rights and Diuttk
(1924) 33 YAL LAW JoURNAL, 501. The use of the concept "primary
right" as determining the extent of the cause of action was criticized in
Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 YU LAW JOURNAL, 317. Ita
use in the present connection as pointing out the successive -tepo to be
alleged seems decidedly useful.
42 Muncie Pulp Co. v. Davis (1904) 162 Ind. 558, 562, 70 N. E. 875;
Chicago & Erie R. R. v. La in (190S) 110 Ind. 34, 83 N. E. 632, a strict ruling
that the defendant's duty was not shown; see C0aixrNTS, Op. Cit. X!F '7
note 8. See also Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 10, at 553; 6 Standard Enc.
Proc. 671, 2. The comparison of an action to a syllogism is a favorite one.
It is said that the major premise is a rule of law, not to be pleaded; the
minor premise, the facts of the case maling the rule of law applicable (theze
alone are to be pleaded); and the conclusion is the judgment of the court.
New York, N. H., and H. R. R. v. Hzungcrford (1902) 75 Conn. 76, 52 Atl.
487; Bliss, Code Pleading (3d ed. 1894) 230-234; Gibson, The Pid!osophy
of Pleading (1893) 2 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 18.
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bicyclist was injured on a defective street, the objection raised
by the court to the complaint was that it did not allege that the
injury to the plaintiff was caused by the defect in the street."
Again, where the defendants maintained a bridge in a defective
and unsafe condition and the bridge gave way without fault to
the plaintiff, injuring him, the complaint was demurrable for
failure to allege that the falling of the bridge was due to the
condition in which it was maintained. 4 4 An omission of this
kind, while fatal to the sufficiency of the complaint, is generally
due to the carelessness of the pleader, for it is a very simple
matter to put in words showing that "by reason of" the defend-
ant's act the plaintiff was caused the damage in question."
Pleading According to Legal Effect
It is frequently stated in the cases, and sometimes provided in
the codes, that acts and dontracts may be stated according to
their legal effect." The rule is perhaps most often applied in
the case of written instruments such as contracts, which may be
stated according to their legal meaning, e.g., that by his promis-
sory note, the defendant "promised to pay". 47  This in effect
permits a summary of the instrument in the pleading. It should
be noted, however, that this rule really adds no different concept
to that which we already have. The question is one of degree of
particularity of allegation; the final conclusion of the existence
of the remedial right-duty relation is for the court and not the
pleader; but the steps leading to this conclusion may be stated
by giving the legal effect of such steps.48 Philosophically speak-
ing one can plead no other way.40
43 City of Logansport v. Kikm, supra note 36, criticised in text.
44 Berry v. Dole (1902) 87 Minn. 471, 92 N. W. 334; of. Kelly v. Town
of Darlington (1893) 86 Wis. 432, 57 N. W. 51 ("by reason, entirely, of
the insufficiency, want of repair, and defects aforesaid, of and in said
bridge"; complaint sufficient).
-1 Mr. Carmody in his model complaint (N. Y. Practice, 157) seems to
have failed to observe this requirement; the complaint may perhaps be
saved by application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
46 "Acts and contracts may be stated according to their legal effect, but
in so doing the pleading should be such as fairly to apprise the adverse
party of the state of facts which it is intended to prove." Conn. Prac. Bk.,
(1922) sec. 181, p. 283. N. J. P. A. 1912, rule 21. The section goes on to
provide, rather curiously, that where an act is done by an agent, that fact
should be stated. See contra: Weide v. Porter (1876) 22 Minn. 429; Slevin
v. Reppy (1870) 46 Mo. 606; cf. Helena National Bank v. Rocky Mt. Tel.
Co. (1898) 20 Mont. 379. For additional cases on pleading according to
legal effect, see Am. Dig., supra note 11, sec. 10; for the rule at common
law see Stephen Pleading (Williston's ed. 1895) *428-*430.
47 Compare Estes v. Desnoyers Shoe Co. (1900) 155 Mo. 577, 56 S. W.
316 with Kidder v. Port Henry Iron Ore Co. (1911) 201 N. Y. 445, 94 N.
E. 1070.
48 See discussion supra at 268, 269, text.
40 See supra at 264-266, text, on the selection and interpretation of data.
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Use of Forms
Even though the facts and circumstances of each case should
largely determine the degree of particularity of allegation re-
quired, yet, since there are so many recurring sets of facts liti-
gated in our courts, the methods of allegation will naturally tend
to become standardized. There is a decided advantage in this
in that it saves the time of the pleader and of the court in decid-
ing whether a particular form of complaint is sufficient. Hence,
the use of stanidard forms is very desirable. As pointed out in
the next section, it should be possible in a code state to use well
recognized common law forms. It is even desirable that the
judges should prepare suggestive forms which may be available
to the bar, although not absolutely required. The success of
some of the more simple practice codes, notably the Connecticut
Practice Act of 1879, has been attributed in large measure to the
fact that the courts have prepared forms for use in all the more
ordinary cases. This example might well be followed generally
in code states.r°
Notice Pleadizg
A yet more general form of allegation, called "notice pleading",
is in use in a few courts and has been advocated for general
adoption. Under this system the pleading, such as it is, simply
makes a very general reference to the happening out of which
the case arose, and no attempt is made to state the details of the
cause of action. This system seems to have worked well in cer-
tain courts, especially where the matters are more or less stand-
ardi7ed in themselves. It is probably doubtful whether this
form of pleading will be adopted generally for all courts, at least
at the present time. The prevailing idea at the present time
seems to be that notice should be given of all the operative facts
going to make up the plaintiff's cause of action, except, of course,
those which are presumed or may properly come from the other
side.51
THE CERTAINTY REQUIRED OF A PLEADING-USE OF COMMON
LAW PRECEDENTS
The common law rules designed to produce certainty in the
pleadings, and by consequence, certainty or particularity in the
50 See references to the forms in the Conn. Pra. Bk. in Cool:, op. cit.
supra. note 6; COMMENTS, op. cit. supra note 8. See also as to forms in
the English and Michigan practice, Sunderland, op. cit. supra note 6; Sir=-,
op. cit. supra, note 6. Forms are given in, among others, the Alabama,
Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, and TennZsee
statutes. 6 Standard Enc. Proc. 729, 730; 2 Mlass. Gen. Laws, 1921, ch.
231, sec. 147.
M' See Clark, op. cit. supra note 30, at pages 543, 544, referring to
Whittier, Notice Pleading (1918) 31 HAnv. L. Rsv. 501, and other articles.
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issue, are very numerous. The famous statement in Stephen
probably gives a good idea of the nature of those rules.52 What-
ever was alleged must be alleged with certainty; and an example
given is that in pleading performance of conditions in a contract.
It is not sufficient to say that the party has performed the con-
tract, but he must show specifically the time, place and manner
of performance. 23 In accordance with this general idea it was
held that the pleadings must have certainty of time and place.
This was true even where the matter in question was not a ma-
terial part of the issue. Thus, in general, one time might be
alleged and another proved.5 4  So when any right or authority
was set up in respect of realty or personalty, some title to the
property must be alleged; the pleadings "must show title"."
So the pleadings must specify quality, quantity and value with
particularity, they must give the names of persons; and, where
the party is justifying an act under some authority he must show
that with particularity. 6
Beyond these general rules it was attempted to formulate a
statement of degrees of certainty, certain forms of pleading re-
quiring a higher degree of certainty than others. Thus we have
the classic division by Lord Coke of certainty into three degrees:
(1) certainty to a common intent; (2) certainty to a certain in-
tent in general; (3) certainty to a certain intent in every particu-
lar. While these degrees were formally defined with seeming
care, 5 7 the distinction was only one of relative particularity. "In
modern times it comes down to little more than this, that in cer-
tain disfavored actions, such as actions for defamation, and in
certain disfavored defenses, such as dilatory pleas, more facts
must be alleged to make out a prima facie case or repel hostile
construction than in ordinary cases".24
Certain exceptions to the general requirement of certainty were
recognized. Thus, a general mode of pleading was allowed when
great prolixity was thereby avoided. No greater particularity
was required than the nature of the thing pleaded could conven-
iently admit of, and hence where the circumstances constituting
a cause were so numerous and minute that the party pleading
was not and could not be acquainted with them, less certainty
52 Stephen, op. cit. supra, note 46, at *315-*413.
53Ibid. at *370.
54Ibid. at *329. Cf. Dominelli v. Markowski (1925, Del.) 128 At]. 527.
ci Stephen, op. cit. supra. note 46, at *341. Title must be particularly
and specifically alleged according to the recognized precedents and it would
not be sufficient to state the mere conclusion that the party had title. The
rule seems less strictly applied under the codes.
56 Ibid. at *332, *338, *365.
57 For definition see Shipman, Common Law Pleading (Ballantine's ed.
1923) 498.
58 Ibid. at 499.
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was required. The same was true when the allegations from
the other side must reduce the matter to certainty, and also in
the case when the facts lay more in the knowledge of the adverse
party than of the party pleading. Likewise, less particularity
was necessary in the statement of matters of inducement or ag-
gravation than in the main allegation.-"
Use of Comiion Law Precedents in Code Pleading
The precedents worked out at common law under the rules of
certainty deal with the problem of pleading which we are con-
sidering, namely, that of particularity of allegation. Since the
question is fundamentally the same, it would seem that the com-
mon law decisions would be at least highly suggestive, even if
not absolutely binding under the code. This is probably the
attitude of most courts, although objection is made by some.
Most of the codes expressly abolished the forms of pleading at
the common law and provided that the sufficiency of the pleading
should be determined by the code and not otherwise."11 A clear
intention was thus expressed that the common law precedents
should not be binding upon the cases under the code. Just how
far this rule extended, however, has not seemed clear to the
courts. Some judges have felt that the common law distinc-
tions were inherent and fundamental and could not be changed,
and hence they have tended to follow common law precedents
very directly. On the other hand, other judges have felt that
they could break away almost entirely from these common law
rules 61 The difference in attitude among judges has been strilt-
ing.- It would seem, however, that a middle ground is the
59Ibid. at 501-506; Stephen, op. cit. supra note 46, at *379 et -cq. For
application of similar rules in code pleading, see Chicago, St. L. & P. R. R.
v. Wolcott (1895) 141 Ind. 267, 39 N. E. 451; Eqzitable Ace. Is. Co. v.
Sto.t (1893) 135 Ind. 444, 33 N. E. 623.
6 Loc. cit. supra note 2. N. Y. C. C. P. sec. 518 (omitted as "unnecez-
sary" in the N. Y. C. P. A.; see note to N. Y. C. P. A. scc. 241). Alaca,
Sts. 1913, see. 886; Ark., Dig. Sts. 1921, sec. 1020, 1184; Calif., C. C. P.
1923, sec. 421; Colo., C. C. P. Comp. Laws, 1921, see. 53; Idaho, Cormp. Sts.
1919, see. 6684; Burn's Ann. Ind., Sts. 1914, see. 341; Iowa, Corsp. Code,
1919, sec. 7190; Kan., Rev. Sts. 1923, 60-702; Carroll's Ky. Code, 1919,
sec. 88; Minn., Gen. Sts. 1923, see. 9249; Mo., Rev. Sts. 1919, sec. 1219;
Mont., Rev. Code C. P. 1921, sec. 9126; Neb., Comp. Sts. 1922, sce. 8606;
N. M., Ann. Sts. 1915, see. 4102; N. C., Cons. Sts. 1919, Fee. 527; X. D.,
Comp. Laws, 1913, sec. 7439; Ohio Gen. Code, 1921, ccc. 11302; Olfia., Comp.
Sts. 1921, sec. 263; Or., C. C. P. 1920, sec. 04; Porto Rico, Rev. Sts. 1911,
sec- 5084; S. C., C. C. P. 1922, see. 397; S. D., Rev. Code, 1919, sec. 2344;
Utah, Comp. Laws, 1917, sec. 6563; Wash., Comp. Sts. 1922, sec. 255; Wis.,
Sts. 1921, sec. 2644; Wyo., Comp. Sts. 1920, sec. 5046.
61 Cf. Clark, op. cit. supra note 40.
.2 Prof. E. R. Sunderland gives a good resume of the case3 in his intro-
duction to Cases on Code Pleadi2g (1913) 7-15. Thus with Bsh v. Proo-
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proper one to take. The codifiers undoubtedly intended to get
away from the formal distinctions of the common law forms of
action. But this may still be done and yet the forms of allega-
tion, made familiar by long usage in the courts, need not be dis-
carded. This has appeared most strikingly in connection with
the use of the so-called common counts which many code pleaders
thought should be rejected with the adoption of code pleading.
Their use was so familiar to lawyers and apparently so conven-
ient, however, that they were not discarded.,, It would seem,
therefore, that the common law rules as to particularity of alle-
gation, since they have become familiar to pleaders in general,
should be considered at least in point under code pleading, and,
subject to the more flexible nature of code pleading which puts
iless of a premium on formalism, should furnish satisfactory
precedents.6 4  Beyond this it might well be held that any form
of pleading which through long usage under the common law or
elsewyhere has been held to give sufficient notice should be consid-
ered to be sufficient under code pleading rules6 For example
it would seem that the allegations used in the old declaration
of trespass on the case, omitting the repetition and the synony-
mous words used, should furnish a proper basis for the modern
code action of negligence.6
MATTERS WHICH MAY BE OMITTED
Even though the code requires that the facts constituting the'
cause of action shall be stated in the complaint, the rule has
ser (1854) 11 N. Y. 347, compare Knowles v. Gee (1850, N. Y. Sup. Ct)
8 Barb. 300, 4 How. Pr. 316.
6m 34 L. R. A. (N. s.) 364, note; L. R. A. 1918 F. 437, note; Cf. COMMENTS,
op. cit. supra note 8.
64 Cases are cited by Prof. Sunderland, op. cit. supra note 62; see espe-
cially People v. Ryder (1855) 12 N. Y. 433; Mobley v. Cureton (1874) 6
S. C. 49; Lassiter v. Roper (1894) 114 N. C. 17, 18 S. E. 946; Hieston v.
Tyler (1896) 140 Mo. 252, 36 S. W. 654, 41 S. W. 795. See also supra
note 62.
65 See Shipman, The Aid of the Earlier Systems (1898) 7 YALE LAW
JoURNAL, 197, stating that the use of any form good under the common
law will be found good under the codes. Cf. Hill v. Barrett (1853, Ky.)
14 B. Mon. 67. "The rule of pleading at common law was that the declara-
tion must allege 'all the circumstances necessary for the support of the
action, and contain a full, regular and methodical statement of the injury
which the plaintiff has sustained, with such precision, certainty and clear-
ness that the defendant, knowing what he is called upon to answer, may
be able to plead a direct and unequivocal plea; and that the jury may be
able to give a complete verdict upon the issue, and the court, consistently
with the rules of law, may give a certain and distinct judgment upon the
premises.' Read v. Smith, 1 Allen, 519, 520. The rule so stated is the
same under the Practice Act, now G. L. c. 231, sec. 7, cl. 2. Prentiss v.
Barnes, 6 Allen, 410, 411." Davis v. Snyder (1925, Mass.) 147 N. E. 30.
This might well have been said by a code state court.
g6 COMMENTS, op. cit. supra note 8.
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nevertheless come down from common law pleading and has been
applied under the code, that certain matters of the kind which
the law will conclude from the other facts pleaded, or of which
the court has judicial knowledge, or which lie in the knowledge
more of the defendant than the plaintiff, need not be set forth
even though they are material operative facts. Thus, facts which
the law presumes need not be stated. This would include mat-
ters such as the presumption of innocence of crime or fraud and
the like.67  Again, facts necessarily implied from those alleged
need not be stated. This rule has been considered in connection
with the matter of pleading so-called evidential facts from which
the court may draw the conclusion of the existence of the reme-
dial right-duty relation.2- And a very large and important class
of facts of which the court takes judicial knowledge, that is,
which the court is already presumed to know, need not be stated,
It is axiomatic that the plaintiff need not set forth matters of
defense, that is, matters which legally should come from the other
side." ' What matters should legally come from the other side
67 Stephen, op. cit. supra note 46, at 0391; Shipman, op. cit. aupra note
57, at 513; cases collected in Am. Dig., supra note 11, sec. 7. That pre-
sumptions of law need not be pleaded see Ark. Dig. Sts. 1921, sec. 1221;
Burn's Ann. Ind. Sts. 1914, see. 383; Kan. Rev. Sts. 1923, see. 60-750;
Carroll's Ky. Code, 1919, sec. 119; Mo. Rev. Sts. 1919, sec. 1259; Neb.
Comp. Sts. 1922, sec. 8648; N. M. Ann. Sts. 1915, see. 4150; Throchmorton's
Ohio Gen. Code, 1921, sec. 11331; Okla. Comp. Sts. 1921, see. 309; Wyo.
Comp. Sts. 1920, sec. 5673.
68 See Stephen, op. cit. supra note 46, at 0390; Shipman, op. cit. sz'pra
note 57, at 512; cases collected in Am. Dig., supra note 11, sec. 7. A usual
form of statement is that a complaint states a cause of action even though
an essential fact be omitted, if its existence is necessarily inferred from
the existence of other facts specifically alleged. Cf. Duryce v. Yriars (1897)
18 Wash. 55, 50 Pac. 583; Soule v. ,Weatherby (1911) 39 Utah, 530, 118
Pac. 833. As already pointed out, the complaint may be held defective in
form as pleading evidential and not ultimate facts. In any event the
inference must be a necessary one. See supra notes 13, 33.
19 Shipman, op. cit. supra note 57, at 50; Bliss, op. cit. suprv note 42,
at 291-316; so provided by many codes. Iowa, Comp. Code, 1919, sec. 7271,
also codes cited supra note 67. For cases collected see Am. Dig., mupra
note 11, sec. 6. The allegation of a fact contrary to that of which the
court takes judicial knowledge, will be disregarded. Cooke v. Tallman
(1874) 40 Iowa, 133; Wadhain's Oil Co. -v. Tracy (1909) 141 Wis. 150, 123
N. W. 785; Chavez v. Times-Mirror Co. (1921) 185 Calif. 20, 195 Pac. 066;
Rome Ry. & Light Co. v. Keel (1907) 3 Ga. App. 709, 60 S. E. 468. For
certain interesting cases, see Masline r. New York, N. H. & H. R. A.
(1920) 95 Conn. 702, 111 AtL 639; Sou.e v. Bon Ami Co. (1922, 2d Dept.)
201 App. Div. 794, 195 N. Y. Supp. 574, aff'd 275 N. Y. 609. This case is
criticised as going too far in (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 75; (1923) 8 CORN. L.
QuART. 146.
-0 This is the common law rule. Shipman, op. cit. supra note 57, at 510,
511; Stephen, op. cit. supra note 46, at *387. But not the equity rule.
Keigwin, Cases on Eqvity Pleading, 31, 37. Of the many code cases see
Westen Union Telegraph Co. v. Henley (1901) 157 Ind. 90, 60 N. E. 632;
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are of course problems to be considered in detail. Suppose, how-
ever, that the pleader states in his complaint matters which, ac-
cording to the precedents, are to be considered matters of defense
coming properly from the other side. What is the effect of such
method of pleading? The question may come up in two ways.
First, if the complaint does not go further and avoid such mat-
ters of defense, is it demurrable? Secondly, if the defendant
fails to answer such matters of defense, has he thereby admitted
them or are they to be considered entirely immaterial allegations
having no place in the complaint? The strict common law view,
followed apparently by some authorities under the code, which
was contrary to the equity practice, would seem to say that the
allegation is not only unnecessary but improper, and therefore
to be treated as immaterial.7 The other view taken is that
though unnecessary it is not improper and may be considered,
therefore, a material part of the complaint. Hence, the com-
plaint is demurrable if it does not go further and set forth facts
avoiding the defense. 72  Furthermore, the allegations, being con-
sidered material, must be answered as such by the defendant."u
Since the object of pleading under the code is to give adequate
notice to the opposing party and to the court of the case upon
which the pleader relies, it would seem that the earlier the pleader
more completely sets forth his position, the more the pleading ob-
Royal Ins. Co. v. Schwing (1888) 87 Ky. 410, 9 S. W. 242; Iransaburo
Ohsaki v. Ahern (1923) 61 Calif. App. 787, 215 Pac. 714; Todd ,. Bradley
(1923) 99 Conn. 307, 122 Atl. 68. Cases collected in Am. Dig., supra note
11, sec. 67.
71 Shipman, op. cit. supra note 57, at 510; Lush v. Russell (1850) 5 Exch.
203; Canfield v. Tobias (1863) 21 Calif. 349; List v. Kortepeter (1866)
26 Ind. 27 (apparently no longer law in Indiana, see notes 72, 73, infra) ;
Scottish Nat. Ins. Co. v. Adams (1905) 122 Ill. App. 471; Hammett v.
Porter (1922) 71 Colo. 511, 208 Pac. 452; Murphy v. National City Bank
(1922, 1st Dept.) 203 App. Div. 571, 196 N. Y. Supp. 859 (without citing
the N. Y. cases given in note 72, infra); cf. Smythe v. Tomlinson (1913,
Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 140 N. Y. Supp. 840; Kornhauser v. Ulin (1919, Sup.
Ct. Spec. T.) 175 N. Y. Supp. 700 (relying on authorities that defenses
need not be anticipated); Linton v. Unexcelled Fireworks Co. (1891) 124
N. Y. 533, 27 N. E. 406; Newell v. Newell (1920) 68 Colo. 505, 192 Pac.
505; Brocklehurst v. Potter & Marsch (1916) 225 Mass. 3, 113 N. E. 616;
cases collected in Am. Dig., supra note 11, sec. 67. For the equity practice
see Keigwin, supra note 70, at 31, 37.
72 Mallow v. Eastes (1913) 179 Ind. 267, 100 N. E. 836; Johnson v. Har-
rison (1912) 177 Ind. 240, 97 N. E. 930; Calvo v. Davies (1878) 73 N. Y.
211; Sternstein v. Heit (1919, 1st Dept.) 186 App. Div. 45, 173 N. Y. Supp.
808; Western Travelers' Ace. Ass'n v. Tomson (1905) 72 Neb. 661, 103 N.
W. 695; Jamison v. MeMillen (1920) 26 N. M. 231, 190 Pac. 726; James v.
Maddox (1922) 153 Ga. 208, 111 S. E. 731; Wright v. Hix (1919) 203 Ala.
425, 83 So. 341. Cf. Furlong v. White (1921) 51 Calif. App. 265, 196
Pac. 903.
73 Bowlus v. Phenix Ins. Co. (1892) 133 Ind. 106, 32 N. E. 319; Whet-
stone v. Beloit Straw Board Co. (1890) 76 Wis. 613, 45 N. W. 535.
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jective has been obtained. Hence, the latter view, following the
equity rather than the common law practice, would seem the
more desirable under code pleading.
PLEADING DIRECTLY AND TRUTHFULLY
Closely akin to the question of specificness of allegation just
considered is the problem of enforcing directness and truthful-
ness in pleading. That pleadings should be true seems obvious.
Otherwise they do not fulfill any of their functions; they serve
to conceal and mislead, not to clarify and explain. Hence a wil-
fully false pleading is disposed of summarily. 4
But the problem ordinarily arises-and here it touches the
problem considered in the previous section-when the pleader is
not absolutely certain either of his facts or his law. It is all
very well to say that theoretically he should be certain of both.
Practically, however, as any lawyer knows, he often cannot be
sure how his evidence will develop until it is all in. Nor can he
often be sure until that time which of various legal theories he
should adopt for his case. And so we have the struggle between
the court and the pleader; the court trying to force the pleader
to a clear and definite statement, and the pleader trying to pro-
tect himself to cover the chance development of his case.
It has been well developed by Professor Gregory Hanldn, in
an article dealing with this general subject,7" that we can hardly
expect the pleader to be more definite and certain on paper than
he is in his own mind. Where he is uncertain as to what the
trial will develop, he naturally will be vague and indefinite. On
the other hand, we should not put a premium upon ignorance, so
that the pleader who knows the least about his case will be most
protected by his pleading. The true rule would seem to be that,
except for intentional or reckless misstatements, there should
be no penalty upon inconsistency and vagueness on the ground
of lack of truthfulness of the statement; but that we should still
apply the requirement of reasonably fair notice of his case so
that the court's objective standard of certainty shall be met-
At common law the rule that pleadings should be true was rec-
ognized, though apparently not often enforced by direct proceed-
ings. The modern technique of striking the pleading as sham
and frivolous, while perhaps available, seems not to have been
highly developed 77 But there were well recognized rules to se-
cure directness and prevent obscurity and confusion in plead-
4 See authorities, infra note 77.
7 Hankin, Alternative and Hypothctical Pleading (1924) 33 YALE LAw
JouRNAL, 365.
76 See discussion, supra text, p. 265 et seq.
77 Stephen, op. cit. supra note 46, at *488-0490; Shipman, op. cit. czipra
note 57, at 523, 524; See also opinion of Page, J. in Hamna -. Mitchecl (1922,
1st Dept.) 202 App. Div. 504, 196 N. Y. Supp. 43, aff'd (1923) 23G N. Y.
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ing. The common law point of view and its gradual modifica-
tion under the more liberal codes is well illustrated by a particu-
lar one of these rules, namely the prohibition against pleading
in the alternative which may profitably be considered in some
detail.
Pleading in the Alternative
Pleading in the alternative may occur as to the subject matter
of the cause or defense, or as to the parties. The development
of the rule as to joinder of parties in the alternative will not be
discussed in this connection.78
At common law pleading in the alternative was not permis-
sible. Thus, an allegation that the defendant wrote and pub-
lished, or oaused to be written and published, a certain libel,
was bad for uncertainty." Under the codes the general rule is
considered to be the same,80 but it is subject to the modification
hereinafter noted.
Now the difficulty is that the pleader often cannot know, and
cannot reasonably be expected to know, which of two or more
-alternatives is the correct one. This is particularly true as to
the details of the injury of breach which often are known only
to the defendant in advance of trial. The problem is the one
already discussed of the degree of certainty which may fairly
be required of the pleader. To enforce the rule as harshly as
at common law is unfairly to trap the pleader beyond any re-
quirement of fair notice to the defendant. Hence one of the
most simple, desirable and effective improvements upon the com-
mon law rules is the adoption of the rule permitting allega-
tions in the alternative. 81 This has been done by statute or rule
of court in England, under the Federal Equity Rules and in at
least six jurisdictions in this country.2 In apparently at least
534, 139 N. E. 724; General Investment Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit
Co. (1923) 235 N. Y. 133, 139 N. E. 216.
78 See (1925) 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 113; (1924) 33 ibid. 328; (1922)
35 HARv. L. REv. 466; (1918) 31 ibid. 1034.
70 Shipman, op. cit. at 519, 520, and cases cited; Stephen, op. cit. at *426;
Hankin, op. cit. supra note 75.
so McCrossin v. Noyes Bros. & Cutler (1919) 143 Minn. 181, 173 N. W.
566; Hankin, op. cit. supra note 75; (1924) 34 YAL LAW JOURNAL, 103;
(1919) 33 HARV. L. Ray. 244. Cases are collected Am. Dig., supra note 11,
sec. 20. The remedy is a motion to make more specific, under the more
liberal view. Southern Ry. v. Wahl (1924, Ind.) 145 N. E. 523; but see
Cohn v. Graber (1922, 1st Dept.) 201 App. Div. 264, 194 N. Y. Supp. 233.
81 (1923) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 109; (1924) 34 ibid. 103; Hankin, op.
cit. supra note 75; Clark, op. cit. supra note 41, at 825, 826.
82 Eng. Ann. Prac. 1924, Order 19, Rules 4, 24; Fed. Eq. Rule 30; Conn.
Prac. Bk. (1922) sec. 174, p. 282; Carroll's Ky. Code, 1919, art. 113, sec.
4; 2 Mass. Gen. Laws, 1921, ch. 231, sec. 37; 1 Mo. Rev. Sts. 1919, sec. 1254;
N. J. Comp. Sts. (1st supp. 1911-15) 1215, art. 170, rule 153; N. M4. Ann.
Sts. 1915, art. 4141, see. 75; (1924) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 103.
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ten more it is permitted by judicial decision.6 When the true
nature of the problem is recognized, the arbitrary form of the
rule ought to be made to yield in all states, even without legis-
lative aid.s-
Even at common law it was possible substantially to evade the
harsh effects of the rule by stating the same cause of action in
several counts, setting forth in the various counts the different
positions the pleader might desire to take. A question has been
made whether under the codes such a practice is permissible.
Even if permissible, the practice is cumbersome and confusing,
and should not be made necessary by arbitrary rules out of place
under code practice15
Pleading Hypothetically or Otherwise Ambiguously
Likewise at common law, and probably under the codes gener-
ally, it has been considered improper to plead hypothetically, e.g.,
that if a certain fact was so, then such and such results followed.
In fact, there seems even less of a tendency to relax the rule
against hypothetical pleading than to relax the corresponding
rule against alternative pleading. o But as Professor Hankin
83 51oss-Shefield Co. v. Pilgrim (1915) 14 Ala. App. 346, 70 So. 301;
Pacetti v. Georgia Ry. (1909) 6 Ga. App. 97, 64 S. E. 302; but see Rocblfng'a
Sons Co. v. Southent Power Co. (1914) 142 Ga. 464, 83 S. E. 138; Farmers'
Bank of Aiispe v. Ar2ispe Mercantile Co. (190S) 139 Iowa, 246, 117 N. W.
672; Coleman v. Teddlie (1901) 106 La. 192, 30 So. 99; Dicl v. Hycr
(1916) 94 Ohio St. 351, 114 N. E. 251; Chicago, R. L & P. Ry. v. McIntirc
(1911) 29 Okla. 797, 119 Pac. 1008; Tvrncy v. Southcrn Pacific Co. (1904)
44 Or. 280, 75 Pac. 144; City of San Antonio v. Potter (1903) 31 Tex. Civ.
App. 263, 71 S. W. 764; Rasmussen v. MeKvight (1883) 3 Utah, 315, 3
Pac. 83; (1924) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 103; cf. Bank of Saluda v. Feacer
(1910) 87 S. C. 95, 68 S. E. 1045. In spite of a little difference of opinion
the New York rule seems in accord. Kass v. Garment Ccztcr Realty Co.,
Inc. (1924, 1st Dept.) 209 App. Div. 647, 205 N. Y. Supp. 94 (claim for
reformation of a lease "because of mutual mistake or mistake of the le-see
and fraud of the lessor"); Munn v. Cook (1890, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 24 Abb.
N. C. 314-357; Mutual Life 12w. Co. 2'. MeCuzrdy (1907, 1st Dept.) 118 App.
Div. 815, 103 N. Y. Supp. 829; Hasberg v. Moses (1903, 1st Dept.) 81 App.
Div. 199, 80 N. Y. Supp. 867; contra: Cohn v,. Grabcr, spia note 80 (the
defendant "caused or permitted"). Cf. Heaphy -,. Eidlitz (1921, 1st Dept.)
197 App. Div. 455, 189 N. Y. Supp. 431. Where the allegations are in the
alternative, each alternative must be sufficient. Johansson v. Kemnp (1025,
1st Dept.) 207 N. Y. Supp. 468; Farmers' Bandk v. Amcricau Surety Co.
(1924, Ky.) 265 S. W. 505; (1919) 33 HAnv. L. REV. 244. It is not clear,
however, why the insufficient alternative should not be rejected as sur-
plusage.
s1 See references, supra note 81.
sr See Clark, op. cit. supra note 81; (1925) 34 YALE LAw Jou:nrAL, 879,
884. Hence the case of Heaphy v,. Eidlit:, supra note 83, requiring a
separate statement, seems unjustified.
SEmison v. Owyhee Ditch Co. (1900) 37 Or. 577, 62 Pac. 13; Stroo
Plush Co. -. Talcott (1908, 2d Dept.) 129 App, Div. 14, 113 N. Y. Supp.
214; cases cited in (1924) 33 YALE LA w JOURNAL, 377-379; Bliss, op. cit.
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has also shown in this connection, the two situations seem essen-
tially similar. In each case the problem involves the degree of
certainty which the pleader has in his own mind. If he is not
absolutely certain that a particular set of facts is the correct
statement of his cause, naturally he will want to frame his alle-
gations contingently to provide for the existence of that set of
facts and for the existence of, some other set of facts.8 7 Conse-
quently it seems that the same rule should apply to hypothetical
pleading as to alternative pleading. There should be no arbi-
trary rule holding such pleadings improper, but the questions in
each case should be these, first, of the pleader truthfully stating
his own position, and second, of fair notice under all the cir-
cumstances.
Similar principles should apply to other cases of ambiguous
or doubtful pleadings prohibited by express rule of the common
law. These included also pleadings which were said to be "in-
sensible" or. "repugnant", "argumentative" or "by way of re-
cital".8 8 The common law prohibition against "duplicity" or
double pleading, repeated in a very few codes, would also seem
to be of the same character. 9
NECESSITY OF A THEORY OF THE PLEADINGS
The requirement of a theory of the pleading is thus stated by
the Indiana court, which has perhaps most consistently enforced
it:
supra note 42, at 463; Shipman, op. cit. supra note 57, at 519. But see
Eppinger v. Kendrick (1896) 114 Calif. 620, 46 Pac. 613; Zeidler v. John-
son (1875) 38 Wis. 335. Hypothetical denials are prohibited in Connecti-
cut (Conn. Prac. Bk. 1922, p. 291, rule 203) and New Jersey (N. J. Prae.
Act, 1912, rule 33).
s71Hankin, op. cit. supra note 75.
88 For statements of these common law rules see Stephen, op. cit. at *14
et seq.; Shipman, op. cit. at 517-520, 407-409. The rules have been applied
in code pleading cases. Thus an argumentative allegation (as by alleging
that A was at X at a time specified in order to show that he was not then
at Y) or one by the way of recital ("whereas A promised B," etc.) has been
held improper. Mallott v. Sample (1904) 164 Ind. 645, 74 N. E. 245 (changed
by statute in 1913, Burn's Ann. Sts. 1914, sec. 343a; Acts 1915, ch. 42,
51); Thompson v. Read (1909, Sup. Ct.) 63 Misc. 235, 118 N. Y. Supp. 452;
Bliss, op. cit. supra. note 42, at 463, 464 ("A recital is not a statement, but
is introductory to a statement*'). But see Fuller Desk Go. v. MoDado
(1896) 113 Calif. 360, 45 Pac. 694. A pleading so ambiguous that no re-
covery is possible on any theory of the complaint is bad. Wahlo V. Great
Northern Ry. (1910) 41 Mont. 326, 109 Pac. 713; Bliss, op. cit. at 459. So
also if the various allegations are wholly repugnant, inconsistent and de-
structive of one another. Bliss, op. cit. at 461. For eases collected gee Am.
Dig., op. cit. supra note 11, sec. 17-22. Defects of this general kind usually
are considered waivable, objection to be taken only by motion. Cf. Battrcll
v. Ohio River Ry. (1890) 34 W. Va. 232, 12 S. E. 699.
89 Duplicity is the relying upon more than one matter which would con-
stitute a sufficient ground of action of the same demand or a sufficient
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"It is an established rule of pleading that a complaint must
proceed upon some definite theory, and on that theory the plain-
tiff must succeed, or not succeed at all. A complaint cannot be
made elastic so as to take form with the varying views of coun-
sel".00
In order that the pleader may fulfill this requirement, he ob-
viously must have a definite conception of the facts of the case
and of the law upon which he relies. Ordinarily every good
lawyer should have this of any case which he is willing to bring
to court. In fact if he has no theory of recovery to suggest to
the court he probably had better not sue, for he can hardly expect
the court to work one out when he cannot. But a real problem
arises when it is necessary to shift one's position at the trial of
the case. This may occur even with the best prepared case,
where the facts do not develop as hoped for; or it may occur
when the law is complex or unsettled, and the pleader has adopted
a theory which he finds the court does not accept. A good pleader
defense of a single claim. It was at variance with the common law pur-
pose of securing a single issue. Shipman, op. cit. at 521-523; Stephen, op.
cit. at *285-'8 313, lxxii. Thus allegations in assumpsit relying on two
promises, one to pay a sum certain, the other to pay quantum mcrit, %ere
held bad for duplicity and also for repugnancy. Hart v. Longfield (1l03,
K. B.) 7 Mod. 148. For modern code provisions, see Mo. Rev. Sts. 1919,
sec. 1242; N. M. Ann. Sts. 1915, see. 4128. A single paragraph in a com-
plaint charging both negligence and wilfulness has been held improper.
Green v. Eden (1900) 24 Ind. App. 583, 56 N. E. 240. See Orr v'. Cooledgc
(1903) 117 Ga. 195, 43 S. E. 427; Scott v. Taylor (1910) 231 Mo. 654, 132
S. W. 1149; cases collected, Am. Dig., supra note 11, sec. 64. The objection
in equity of "multifariousness" is now considered in the same category.
Scott v. Taylor, supra. The case of State v. Scott (1903) 171 Ind. 349,
86 N. E. 409 holding that plaintiff cannot proceed on two distinct theories
in the same paragraph of his complaint illustrates how closely the rule
against double pleadings involves the principle of the "theory of the plead-
ings" criticized infra.
9O Meseall v. Tully (1883) 91 Ind. 96, 99; Oolitic Stone Co. v. Ridge
(1908) 169 Ind. 639, 83 N. E. 246; Chicago, etc. Ry. v. Collin (1924, Ind.
App.) 143 N. E. 712; H. J. Raymond Co. v. Robcrt Royalty Co. (1914) 5
Alaska, 184; Jones v. Winsor (1908) 22 S. D. 480, 118 N. W. 71G; Sorenscn
v. School Distri t (1913) 122 Minn. 59, 141 N. W. 1105; cases cited infra
notes 95-97. For a discussion of the problem and review of the cases, see
Whittier, The Theory of a Pleading (1908) 8 Co0. L. Rcv. 523; Alberts-
worth, The Theory of the Pleadings in Code States (1921) 10 CALI'. L.
REv. 202, reprinted in (1922) 94 CENT. L. JoLrm 389, 406; Scott, Progrca
of the Law-Civil Procedure (1919) 33 HARV. L. REv. 242; NOTES (1918)
32 H!ARv. L. REv. 166; NOTES (1911) 24 HAnv. L. Rav. 480; 50 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 3. For another point of view, see (1910) 8 Micn. L. REV. 315;
D'Arcy, "Theory of Case" (1910) 70 CENT. L. Joun. 294, 311, 402, 455;
The Theory of the Pleading in Code States (1922) 95 ibid. 125.
The rule is here stated as to the complaint; logically it would seem just as
applicable to answers and other pleadings, and this is so held in Indiana but
is not clear elsewhere. Colglazier v. Colglazicr (1888) 117 Ind. 460, 464,
20 N. E. 490, 491; Whittier, op. cit. at 534.
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will naturally try to protect himself against such contingencies
which may occur at the trial. Hence here again our problem is
the same one previously discussed-how definite shall we com-
pel the pleader to be in advance of the actual trial ?"'
So far as the plaintiff's theory of his case means the legal
position taken by his counsel-and this is generally its meaning
-it would seem clear that this is not a part of the complaint.
'This conclusion follows from the code ideal of stating the facts,
not the law, the prayer for relief constituting no part of the
cause of action. If the plaintiff is only to be expected to state
the past occurrences between the parties, and the court is then
to grant him such relief as those occurrences justify, it should
be immaterial that he called his action one of tort whereas the
court thought it was one of contract-or one in "equity" whereas
the court thought it one "at law". This has been ruled many
times by able courts.92  So far as the plaintiff's theory involves
a particular set of facts, he is bound by those he alleged. Yet
as we have seen in this article he should be allowed sufficient
leeway in alleging the facts generally so that he may protect
himself against the minor variations in the witnesses' stories
which may develop at the trial. With freer permission given
by the more liberal modern code rules to set forth the facts in
alternate form he can properly be held to prove the material
facts he has chosen to allege.9 3  Therefore he should not be
forced to fulfill any requirement of having and maintaining a
91 The problem is discussed in the previous sections. It is sometimes
suggested that the privilege of amendment will protect the pleader and
hence he may be required to follow one theory until he amends to state
another. Cf. D'Arcy, op. cit. supra note 90. Where a pleader can amend,
he normally will and should do so, to keep the record clear, unless it means
delay in getting the case on the calendar for trial. But the problem
whether a shift of position is permissible is substantially the same, whether
the record is formally cleared up or not. In Walrath v. Hanover Fire
Ins. Co. (1915) 216 N. Y. 220, 110 N. E. 426; the amendment was per-
mitted by the lower court at the trial and yet the appellate court said it
was.error thus to depart from the original theory of the case. This ruling
is followed in Struzewski v. Farmers' Fire Ins. Co. (1919) 226 N. Y. 338,
123 N. E. 661. Moreover the question often arises in the appellate court
where an amendment has not been made below. The present problem is
not the same as the recognized rule of appellate review that claims not
made in the trial court will not be considered on appeal.
92 See cases cited infra notes 95-97. Good examples are Conaughty V.
Nichols (1870) 49 N. Y. 83; Logan v. Freerks (1905) 14 N. D. 127, 103 N.
W. 426; Metropolis Mfg. Co. v. Lynck (1896) 68 Conn. 459, 36 Atl. 832;
and Brown v. Baldwin (1907) 46 Wash. 106, 89 Pac. 483, where the court
says, "An applicant for justice is not to be turned out of the temple of
justice, scourged with costs, because he happened to come in at one door
instead of another."
93 See discussion, supra text, p. 278 et seq.
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single legal theory of his pleadings; he should be held only to
the ideal of reasonably fair notice of the facts of his case.
Although these principles have been often stated in the cases
and are applied in many, perhaps the majority, of code states,
a great deal of difficulty has been made of the problem by several
jurisdictions. Some, such as Indiana, have attempted to en-
force such a requirement fairly consistentlyp6 Others have
vacillated, perhaps more recently tending to the more liberal
view.95 New York started with the more liberal view, but went
to the other extreme. The cases have since been conflicting,
with perhaps the most prevailing recent tendency, one coincident
with a general recrudescence of strict pleading in that jurisdic-
tion, being to apply the theory of the pleading doctrine 3 Other
9- See supra, note 90, and authorities cited in Whittier, op. cit supra
note 90, at 528 et seq.; Albertsworth, op. cit. supra note 90, at 207-209.
Quite curiously the court of appeals has recently ruled without discussion
that it is an immaterial variance to shift to a claim for breach of an
unexecuted contract from a claim on an executed contract. Franklin
Bank v. Roeckeler Lumber Co. (1925, Ind. App.) 147 N. t. 722. See also
Carpenter Const. Co. v. Scoonover (1925, Ind. App.) 148 N. E. 429. Pro-
fessor Albertsworth includes in the same category as Indiana the follow-
ing: New York, Missouri, Nebraska, Minnesota, South Dakota, Kentucky
and New Mexico. Op. cit. supra note 90. As might be expected, however,
from the course of pleading decisions generally, the decisions in one state
often represent conflicting tendencies. Cf. Morrill v. Alexan.der (1919, Mo.
App.) 215 S. W. 764, not requiring a theory of the pleadings, and the
diverse decisions in New York, in fra note 96.
9- Cf. Supervisors v. Decker (1872) 30 Wis. 624; Pierce v. Carey (1875)
37 Wis. 232; and Dessert Lumber Co. v. Wadleigh (1899) 103 Wis. 318, 79
N. W. 237, with Bieri v. Fonger (1909) 139 Wis. 150, 120 N. W. 862 and
Bruhein v. Stratton (1919) 145 Wis. 271, 129 N. W. 1092. The following
are given by Albertsworth, op. cit. supra note 90, at 212-219, as states now
tending to the more liberal view, Wisconsin, Kansas, Cockrell v. Hcnderoo,
(1909) 81 Kan. 335, 105 Pac. 443; Unitcd States Tire Co. v. Kirl. (1918)
102 Kan. 418, 170 Pac. 811; California, Bell v. Bank of Calif. (1003) 153
Calif. 234, 94 Pac. 889; South Carolina, Furman -v. Tzezbury Land & Tir-
ber Co. (1918) 112 S. C. 71, 99 S. E. 111; Arkansas, Crowder v. For-
dyce Lumber Co. (1910) 93 Ark. 392, 125 S. W. 417. The opposite tendency
seems to be shown in Gallegos v. Sandoval (1909) 15 N. ML 21G, 106 Pae.
373 compared with Kingston v. Walters (1908) 14 N. M. 368, 93 Pac. 700.
36 For the early liberal view see Conazghty v. Nichols, snpra note 92;
W 0ight v. Hooker (1851) 10 N. Y. 51; Emery v. Pease (1859) 20 N. Y.
62; Whittier, op. cit. supra note 90, at 529-532. The stricter viewr came
with Ross v. Mather (1872) 51 N. Y. 108 and Barnes v. Quigley (1874)
59 N. Y. 265; Whittier, op. cit. at 531. This is also stated in Walrath v.
Hanover Fire Ins. Co., supra note 91, followed in Jacson v. Strong, upra
note 39; Struzewski v. Farmers' Fire Ins. Co., supra, note 91; Blachwell
v. Glidden Co. (1924, 1st Dept.) 208 App. Div. 317, 203 N. Y. Supp. 380;
Poth v. Washington Sq. Al. E. Church (1923, 1st Dept.) 207 App. Div. 219,
201 N. Y. Supp. 776, and other recent cases. Cf. Williamson v. Atla3
Powder Co. (1925) 208 N. Y. Supp. 301, where the majority and the
minority could not agree on the legal theory of the case, but the complaint
was ordered dismissed. For more liberal views, see Post v. HoLzingcr
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advanced code states seem always to have followed the view
developed above. 97
At common law the forms of action by placing an arbitrary
limit upon the matters to be considered in a single action to a
certain extent required the symmetry of pleading which seems
the ideal of the stricter code states. Beyond that, however, there
seems at the earlier common law to have been no requirement
of a theory of the pleadings, s although a trace of the doctrine is
found after the return of strict pleading following upon the
adoption of the Hilary Rules of 1834.99 The development of the
idea in code pleading was apparently due largely to judges
trained in the common law who were seeking a logical justifica-
tion for enforcing the strict rules made necessary by that sys-
tem.10
(1925, App. Div.) 208 N. Y. Supp. 287; Graham v. Graham (1909, 3d.
Dept.) 134 App. Div. 777, 119 N. Y. Supp. 1013; Connor v. Philo (1907, 3d
Dept.) 117 App. Div. 349, 102 N. Y. Supp. 427.
97 These are included in Albertsworth, op. cit. suprm note 90, at 219, 222.
Connecticut, Colorado, Washington, North Dakota, North Carolina, Nevada,
Oregon, Idaho, Oklahoma, Iowa, Ohio, Montana, Arizona, Wyoming. See
supra note 92, also Knapp v. .Walker (1900) 73 Conn. 459, 47 Ati. 655,
Cole v. Jerman, (1904) 77 Conn. 374, 59 Atl. 425; Grimes v. Greenblatt
(1910) 47 Colo. 495, 107 Pac. 1111; Outlook Farmers Elevator Co. .
American Surety Co. (1924, Mont.) 223 Pac. 905; Coulter v. Coulter (1923)
73 Colo. 144, 214 Pac. 400; Arnold v. Arnold (1924) 110 Ohio St. 416, 144
N. E. 261; cases cited Albertsworth, loc. cit, Cf. McMillan & Co. v. Dent
(1907) 1 Ch. 107, 113, a case of alternative plaintiffs; which suggests the
question how far the most modern rules such as pleading in the alternative
will be effective if the courts are to adhere to the doctrine of the theory
of the pleadings.
98 Charnley v. Winstanley (1804, K. B.) 5 East, 266; Le Bret v. Papillom
(1804, K. B.) 4 East, 502; Williamson v. Allison (1802, K. B.) 2 East, 44.
See Whittier, op. cit. supra note 90, at 525, 526.
99 Thor v. Bigland (1853) 8 Exch. 724, 731, a case of allegations of
fraud; for similar cases in equity see Whittier, op. cit. supra note 90, at
526, 528. A stricter rule seems to have been applied where fraud war
alleged.
100 The original New York cases of-Ross v. Mather and Barnes v. Quigley,
supra, note 96, were cases where fraud was alleged. No recovery could
then be had in contract. Professor Keigwin, in arguing that the distinc-
tions required by the forms of action, were inherent and fundamental, sug-
gests the effect of the forms in requiring the plaintiff to have a theory of
his case and states that the abolition of those forms does not blot out the
distinctions which must now be preserved through the doctrine of the
theory of the pleading. Keigwin, Cases in Common Law Pleading (1924)
274-284. Similar views are expressed by D'Arcy, op. cit. supra note 90,
and W. T. Hughes in Datum Posts of Jurisprudence (1907) passim, and in
(1912) 44 CHIcAGo LEGAL NEws, 125, 134. The suggestion seems clearly
modern philosophizing and not a contemporaneous view of common law
pleading. It is not found in Chitty. Cf. Chitty, Pleading (5th ed.) *109,
*110. Nor is it found in Stephen. Cf. Stephen, op. cit. at *491-*500 on
the merits of common law pleading. The freedom in issuing new writs
before the time when common law pleading became formal shows little of
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It may again be noted that since facts do not exist apart from
some hypothesis of the pleader, and since any "pleading of the
facts" means a selection and interpretation of data according to
some idea of the pleader,'0 ' the problem is not whether a plead-
ing must have a theory. It must, or else be a meaningless jum-
ble. The problem is whether a theory originally chosen as a
step in the process of convincing the court of the soundness of
the client's case may be abandoned for another theory chosen
for the same purpose. Viewed as merely a step in the entire
process, such a shift, at least where not too drastic, is not unfair
to the opponent.
THE DEMAND FOR JUDGMENT
The codes require the plaintiff to insert in his complaint "a
demand of the judgment to which the plaintiff supposes himseli
entitled".0 - At common law the plaintiff could not recover
greater damages than he had laid in his formal conclusion or ad
daminum clause. 1 3 In equity it was the practice for the com-
plainant to claim the special relief to which he supposed himself
entitled and to add a prayer for general relief. If the prayer
for special relief was insufficient, the court would then grant
such relief as the complainant was entitled to by the case made
in the stating part of the bill. 10 4 Most of the codes contain a
provision, coming from the original Field Code, substantially
as follows:
'"Where there is no answer, the judgment shall not be more
favorable to the plaintiff than that demanded in the complaint.
Where there is an answer, the court may permit the plaintiff to
take any judgment consistent with the case made by the com-
plaint and embraced within the issues".0 3
such inherent differences. Compare the number of writs in Maitland's
articles (1889) 2 HARv. L. REv. 97, 167, 212.
1o See discussion, supra text, p. 264 et scq.
:102 See codes cited notes supra 4, 8. Likewise, where the defendant
deems himself entitled to an affirmative judgment by reason of his counter-
claim, he must demand the judgment in his answer. N. Y. C. P. A., 1921,
sec. 270; N. Y. C. C. P., sec. 509.
103 Stephen, op. cit. at *474; Watkins v. Morgan (1834, K. B.) 6 C. &
P. 661.
30 4 Van Zile, Equity Pleading & Practice, sec. 46. It is often stated that
the court under the prayer for general relief cannot grant relief incon-
sistent with the prayer for specific relief, although the real question seems
to be whether the defendant was unfairly surprised. See Blue V. Blue
(1922) 92 W. Va. 574, 116 S. E. 134; 30 A. L. IL 11G9, with note 1175.
105 N. Y. C. P. A., 1921, see. 479; C. C. P., sec. 1207. Cf. First Report,
supra note 2, sec. 231: "The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there be no
answer, cannot exceed that which he shall have demanded in his com-
plaint; but in any other case, the court may grant him any relief consist-
ent with the case made by the complaint, and embraced within the issue."
Ariz. Rev. Sts. 1913, see. 549; Colo. C. C. P. 1921, sec. 1S7; Calif. C.
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In Kentucky the restriction on the relief to that prayed for ap-
plies where no "defense" is filed;106 in Kansas, Ohio, Oklahoma
and Wyoming it applies if the defendant fails to appear;l" 7 and
in Missouri it applies upon the default of the defendant.'"
The wording of the original code, still followed in most juris-
dictions, was most unfortunate in applying the restriction to the
case where no answer has been filed. It seems quite clear that
the codifiers contemplated the case where the defendant did not
appear and defend. It was only fair that the defendant if he
chose should let the case go by default, secure in the knowledge
of the extent of the relief to be entered against him; and only
where he had appeared to defend was it proper to go beyond
this. That this was the idea of the codifiers is shown by their
express statement as well as by their use elsewhere of the word
"canswer" in a broader sense than the pleading technically called
the answer.10 Hence "answer" should have been given a
C. P. 1923, sec. 580; Idaho, Comp. Sts. 1919, sec. 6829; Burn's Ann. Ind.
Sts. 1914, see. 394; Iowa, Code, 1924, sec. 11573; Minn. Gen. Sts. 1923,
sec. 9392; Mont. Rev. Code, 1921, sec. 9316; Nev. Rev. Laws, 1912, sec.
5241; N. C. Cons. Sts. 1919, sec. 606; N. D. Comp. Laws, 1913, sec. 7680;
S. C. Code, 1922, sec. 598; Utah, Comp. Laws, 1917, sec. 6857; Wis. Sts.
1921, sec. 2886: Porto Rico, Comp. Rev. Sts. 1911, sec. 5175.
106 Kentucky, Carroll's Code, 1919, sec. 90; "but if defense be made,
he may have judgment for other relief, under a prayer therefor." Hence
a prayer for general relief seems requisite. A demurrer has been hold
not a defense under this statute. Board Sinking Fund Comrs. v. Mason
& Foard Co. (1897) 19 Ky. Law, 771, 41 S. W. 548.
107 Kan. Rev. Sts. 1923, 60-2501; Ohio Gen. Code, 1921, sec. 11281; Okla.
Comp. Sts. 1921, sec. 233; Wyo. Comp. Sts. 1920, sec. 5623, providing for
the form of the summons and adding "If the defendant fails to appear
judgment shall not be rendered for a larger amount and the costs."
108 Mo. Rev. Sts. 1919, sec. 1531. Cf. secs. 1524, 1528. This has been
held, however, not to justify other relief than that claimed where the defend.
ant has only demurred. Rush v. Brown (1890) 101 Mo. 586, 14 S. W. 735.
In Connecticut the relief is restricted to that demanded "upon a default,"
but "a proper amendment" of the demand for judgment is necessary to
the awarding of other relief. Conn. Prac. Bk. (1922) p. 298, n. 237.
There may be a demurrer to the prayer for relief. Ibid. p. 292, n. 207.
Where a complaint is amended so as to call for legal instead of equitable
relief, the defendant shall have "a reasonable opportunity to claim trial
by jury." Conn. Gen. Sts. 1918, sec. 5673. Under this practice the form
of the demand or prayer becomes more important than under the usual
code practice, although amendments are freely allowed. Conn. Gen. Sts.
1918, sec. 5668-5673.
109 See First Report, supra note 2, sec. 231, note: "It will be recollected
that the plaintiff is required to state, in his complaint, the relief to which
he supposes himself entitled. It will sometimes happen, that he mistakes
that relief; if he do so, and the defendant do not appear, judgment
ought to be given for that only, which the plaintiff has demanded. If
both parties appear, and the whole controversy be gone into, there seems
to be no reason, why the plaintiff should not have the relief to which he
is entitled, though he may have mistaken it in his complaint." In the orig-
inal code there was no provision for formal entry of appearance by the
286
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broader meaning than the filing of the technical answer, and
should have referred to any step taken by the defendant to de-
fend, such as the filing of a demurrer or motion. The decisions
especially in New York have been conflicting on this point, with
perhaps the present tendency, in that state at least, to apply the
restriction unless the defendant has filed an answer."" As in-
defendant as under the present system. The defendant submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court by filing some "pleading" (including not merely
an answer but also a demurrer or motion). Hence default of appearance
was only made by failing to file an ansswering plcading. In the summons
the defendant was required "to answer the complaint and serve a copy
of his answer" within 20 days. Ibid. sec. 107. The plaintiff was also to
insert a notice in the summons that in an action on contract for the re-
covery of money, he would take judgment for a sum specified "if the de-
fendant fail to answer the complaint" and in other actions, "that if the
defendant fail to answer the complaint, the plaintiff will apply to the
court for the relief demanded in the complaint." Ibid. see. 108. In ibid.
sec. 201, 202, provisions are made for "judgment upon failure to answer,"
stating that "judgment may be had, if the defendant fail to answer the
complaint, as follows," etc. Obviously "answer" here would include de-
murrers and motions. See Atchison, T. and S. F. R. R. v. Lambert (19121
31 Okla. 300, 121 Pac. 654; Ann. Cas. 1913 E. 329, with note 331; Starr v.
Francis (1840, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 22 Wend. 633. It should have been given
the same meaning in the statute, supra note 105. In most of the codes the
provisions as to the form of the summons and the taking of judgment by
default follow New York. In Minnesota, however, a default is talzen
where no answer or demurrer is received. Minn. Gen. Sts. 1923, sec. 9256,
a provision apparently inconsistent with the general restriction. Ibid. see.
9392; supra note 105. As to the object of the prayer as notice so that a
default may safely be suffered, see Uzitcd Statc. v. Sloan Sldpyard Corp.
(1919, W. D. Wash.) 270 Fed. 613; City of Parsons v. Parson-, WVatcr Sup-
ply & Power Co. (1919) 104 Kan. 294, 178 Pac. 438.
110 That "answer" includes demurrers or motions, see Johnson v. Kelly
(1874, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 2 Hun, 139; Mackey v. Aner (1870, N. Y. Sup. Ct.I
8 Hun, 180; Sims v. Farson (1913, 3d Dept.) 157 App. Div. 38, 141 N. Y.
Supp. 673; Towrmend v. Whitacre (1920, 1st Dept.) 190 App. Div. 716,
180 N. Y. Supp. 368; Port v. Hoizingcr (1925, 2d Dept.) 212 App. Div. 124,
208 N. Y. Supp. 287; cf. James v. Schafcr (1924, Calif.) 233 Pac. 70; Lane
v. Gluckazuf (1865) 28 Calif. 288; Hansfprd v. Holda~m (1878, Ky.) 14
Bush, 210; Jackson v. Straebe (1922) 150 Blinn. 329, 185 N. W. 290.
Contra: Kelly v. Downing (1870) 42 N. Y. 71, 77; Edison v. Girvan (1883,
N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 29 Hun, 422; Cody v. First Nat. Bank (1901, 1st Dept.)
63 App. Div. 199, 71 N. Y. Supp. 277; Black z,. Vanderbilt (1002, 1st Dept.)
70 App. Div. 16, 74 N. Y. Supp. 1095; Fidelity Trust Co. 2. Intcrn'l Ry.
(1922, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 118 Mlisc. 227, 193 N. Y. Supp. 72G; Ckadbournz
v. Mayer (1924, 1st Dept.) 207 App. Div. 754, 202 N. Y. Supp. 805; Daly
v. Sobieski (1924, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 123 Mlisc. 176, 204 N. Y. Supp. 546;
McDonald v. Skinner (1925, Sup. Ct.) 124 Mlisc. 545, 209 N. Y. Supp. 219;
Gosselin Corp v. Mario Tapparelli Fit Piatro, Inc. (1920, 1st Dept.) 191
App. Div. 580, 181 N. Y. Supp. 883, aff'd (1920) 229 N. Y. 596, 129 N. E.
922; Standard Film Serv. Co. v. Alexander Filni Corp. (1925) 209 N. Y.
Supp. 924; Buena Vista Fruit & Vineyard Co. v. Tuohy (1895) 107 Calif.
243, 40 Pac. 386; Mariner v. Milisch (1921) 45 Nev. 193, 200 Pac. 478. See
(1924) 24 COL. L. REV. 286; (1924) 33 Y,%LE LAYW JOURNAL, 881.
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dicated by the statutes above referred to, a slight change in the
wording of the code would remove the difficulty.111 As it now
stands, the New York courts have tended to make a technical
construction of a complaint and then to throw it out on the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss, even though it shows a proper case
for some relief. Thus on a complaint for specific performance,
it is ruled that failure to allege that there is no adequate remedy
at law makes the claimed relief inappropriate, and that since no
answer has been filed, the case cannot be retained to award
damages. 112  Such rulings make a jest of the fusion of law and
equity.
Relief upon the Defendant's Default
Where the defendant has defaulted-or by the more technical
rule, failed to answer-he is entitled to rely upon the plaintiff's
demand as showing the extent of the judgment against him.
Consequently, any excess of judgment over that demanded, or any
different kind of judgment, is absolutely null and void, and may
be attacked in a collateral proceeding. The part of the judgment
covered by the demand is valid.113
Relief Where the Defendant has Contested
Where the defendant has appeared, or by the stricter rule, has
filed his answer, it is well settled that the demand does not limit
the judgment. Then according to the code the plaintiff may take
any judgment consistent with the case made by the complaint
and embraced within the issues.114 Thus an excess of damages
over that claimed may be given. 15 Or where the plaintiff has
III See the statutes cited supra notes 106-108.
12 See recent New York cases supra note 110; (1924) 33 YALE LAW
JoURNAL, 881; Clark, op. cit. supra note 41.
113 Sache v. Wallace (1907) 101 Minn. 169, 112 N. W. 386; 11 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 803, note; Reynolds v. Stockton (1891) 140 U. S. 254, 11 Sup. Ct.
773; Griffith, v. Hubbard (1896) 9 S. D. 16, 67 N. W. 850. But see Jones
v. Jones (1891) 78 Wis. 446, 47 N. W. 728; Mach v. Blanchard (1902) 15
S. D. 432, 90 N. W. 1042; Foley v. Foley (1898) 120 Calif. 33, 52 Pac. 122.
Cf. Gum-Elastic Roofing Co. v. Mexico Pub. Co. (1895) 140 Ind. 158, 39
N. E. 443 with Unf!ied v. Heberer (1878) 63 Ind. 67.
114 See code provisions, supra note 105; Emery v. Pease, supra note 96;
Marquat v. Marquat (1855) 12 N. Y. 336; Doctor v. Reiss (1917, 1st Dept.)
180 App. Div. 62, 167 N. Y. Supp. 193; Minneapolis Red Lake etc. Ry v.
Brown (1906) 99 Minn. 384, 109 N. W. 817; United States F. & G. Co. v.
Nash (1912) 20 Wyo. 65, 121 Pac. 541, 124 Pac. 269; Donovan v. McDevitt
(1907) 36 Mont. 61, 92 Pac. 49; Loutzenhiser v. Peck (1916) 89 Wash. 435,
154 Pac. 814. Cf. Hoffman v. Pacific Coast Const. Co. (1918) 37 Calif. App.
125, 173 Pac. 776, where there was no prayer at all.
115 Lane v. Gluckauf, supra note 110; Bozarth v. McGillicuddy (1898)
19 Ind. App. 26, 47 N. E. 397, 48 N. E. 1042; but of. West Kentucky Coal
Co. v. Davis (1910) 138 Ky. 667, 128 S. W. 1074; Martin v. Brown (1912)
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prayed for alimony, he may be awarded a divorce if the facts
justify it.11c A very usual case is where relief of an equitable
nature has been prayed; the courts will award damages or vice
versa. The hesitation shown by some courts at different times
to apply this rule wholeheartedly is due not so much to any diffi-
culty as to the demand but to a confusion as to the union of law
and equity and the meaning of a cause of action.11 7
Relation of the Deniand for Judginezt to the Cause of Action
Following from the principles just stated, as well as from the
general ideas of code pleading, it seems almost universally con-
sidered that the demand for judgment is no part of the cause of
action. 118 This matter has been considered elsewhere in connec-
tion with the nature of the cause of action where it was concluded
that the idea of the code was that the plaintiff should state the
facts giving ground for societal action through the courts, that
these constituted the cause of action and that the legal conclusion
to be drawn from these facts, while it was to be asked for by the
plaintiff in his demand for judgment, yet was actually to be
drawn by the court. The court's view of the law, not the
pleader's, was to govern, even where the judgment was favor-
able to the plaintiff.119 Hence in general the demand for judg-
ment plays no part in the interpretation of the cause of action.12-
But the question has arisen, where the statement of the cause
of action has been considered doubtful or ambiguous, whether
the prayer for relief may not be resorted to, in order to solve
the doubt. It'seems quite clear that only as a last resort is this
method of construction of the pleader's cause to be made - ' But
a considerable number of cases have held that as stated by the
162 Mo. App. 223, 144 S. W. 1115; Cumming v. Lawrence (1010) 87 S. C.
457, 69 S. E. 1090; Beranek v. Beranch (1902) 113 Wis. 272, 89 N. W. 146.
116Smith v. Smith (1903) 67 Kan. 841, 73 Pac. 50. Cf. Coqilhlard v.
Coquillard (1916) 62 Ind. App. 489, 113 N. E. 481 (suit for partition
treated as proceeding to convert land into a fund).
117 Clark, op. cit. supra note 41.
118 Marquat v. Marquat, supra note 114; Musgrovc v. Macon Co. Ban!:
(1914) 187 Mo. App. 483, 174 S. W. 171; Bztrnhan-Hanna-M3ngcr Dry
Goods Co. v. Hill (1912) 17 N. M. 347, 128 Pac. 62; Durhant v. Pasco (1924,
N. M.) 227 Pac. 599; South Bend Chilled Plow Co. v. Cribb Co. (1900)
105 Wis. 443, 81 N. W. 675. Cases cited supra notes 114-116; eaces cal-
lected Am. Dig. Judgments, sec. 252, Pleading, sec. 72. See Clark, op. cit.
supra note 40, at 829; Clark, op. cit. supra note 41, at 4, 5. A different
view is expressed by McCaskill, Actions and Ca=cs of Actions (1923) 34
YALn LAw JOURNAL, 614, criticised by the writer in (1925) 34 YAM. LAw
JOURNAL, 879.
11Idaho Irr. Co. v. Dill (1914) 25 Idaho, 711, 139 Pac. 714.
120 Cor ' v. Gaynor (1871) 21 Ohio St. 277; Easley r. Prewitt (1360)
37 2Mo. 361.
121L See cases in preceding and following notes.
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New York Court of Appeals, "the relief asked for must solve the
doubt because there is no other solution." 122 At first blush this
would seem not unreasonable; but in view of the results reached,
it may, perhaps, be doubted whether it should be permissible even
in this limited class of cases to look to the demand for judgment
to ascertain the meaning of the complaint. The effect seems, in
any such case, to be that the relief is restricted to that claimed,
contrary to the provisions of the code.123  In fact the cases apply-
ing this principle seem to be in the main cases where the court
is applying the improper "theory of the pleadings" doctrine.12
Thus it may be trying to determine whether the cause is "legal"
or "equitable" and only be able to do this by resort to the prayer
for relief. Under the code the question should not be this, but
should be simply whether the plaintiff has stated any ground for
judicial relief. 1 2  If the court is fairly in doubt about this the
better method would seem to be to treat the statement of the
cause itself as too indefinite, rather than to resort to the prayer
for relief. 26
Since the demand for judgment is no part of the cause, a de-
murrer will not lie to it on the ground that the relief prayed
for is not proper. 27  In general, also, no amendment of it is
necessary, although it has been permitted. This seems justified
since it enables the plaintiff to get the legal conclusion he sup-
ports on record. 128
122 O'Brien v. Fitzgerald (1894) 143 N. Y. 377, 38 N. E. 371; Cobb v.
Smith (1868) 23 Wis. 261; North Side Loan etc. Bldg. Soc. v. Nakiolski
(1906) 127 Wis. 539, 106 N. W. 1097; Frick v. Freudenthal (1904, Sup.
Ct.) 90 N. Y. Supp. 344; Aid v. Bowerman (1925, Wash.) 232 Pac. 297;
Am. Dig., supra note 11, sec. 72. Cases are referred to in Whittier, op. cit.
supra note 90, at 527, 528.
22a This is also strikingly shown in the writings of Prof. McCaskill
(see supra note 118) where the learned writer advocates resort to the
prayer for relief to determine and limit the right involved.
124 See discussion by Whittier, op cit. supra note 90.
12 See articles cited supra note 118.
126 A complaint is defective for failure to give the facts, not the legal
conclusion; and the court should be forced to say either that the
facts are lacking or that the complaint is sufficient. Otherwise it is
likely to hold the plaintiff to a particular legal theory indicated by the
prayer.
127Sommer v. Ehrgott (1920, 2d Dept.) 193 App. Div. 663, 184 N. Y.
Supp. 802; Jordan v. Schaefer (1918) 40 S. D. 140, 166 N. W. 547; Lowry
v. Dutton (1867) 28 Ind. 473; Badridge v. Ryan (1924 Mo.) 260 S. W.
536, see supra note 110. For the Connecticut rule contra see supra note
108.
128 Grand Island S. & L. Assn. v. Moore (1894) 40 Neb. 686, 59 N. W.
115; Newman v. Covenant Mut. Ins. Assn. (1889) 76 Iowa, 56, 40 N. W.
87; Donovan v. McDevitt, supra note 114; Walsh v. McKcen (1888) 75
Calif. 519, 17 Pac. 673; Burd v. Downing (1923) 60 Calif. App. 490, 213
Pac. 287; Culver v. Rodgers (1877) 33 Ohio St. 537. That an amendment
is not necessary see Snehoda, v. First Nat. Bank (1924) 115 Kan. 836, 224
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Relief in the Alterzative
At common law parties plaintiff or defendant could not be
joined in the alternative, and claims could not be made against
two persons on the ground that either one or the other was liable.
While this has also been the general view under the code, yet the
modern more liberal codes make express provision for such
joinder. Hence under these codes, unlike the older ones, the
demand for such judgments may properly be in the alternative. 2
We have further seen that much the same progression has
taken place with reference to the matter of alleging the facts
constituting the cause of action in the alternative, the more ad-
vanced result here being reached by many courts without modifi-
cation of the code itself. 30 Where facts are so alleged, often the
ultimate remedy to be applied will remain the same.31  But in
other cases, it may be appropriate that alternate relief should
be claimed based upon an alternate construction of the cause of
action. This is sometimes expressly authorized in the code.1
In any event it seems that it should follow from general permis-
sion to plead in the alternative, since such permission gives the
authority for the statement of the facts in the alternative, and
thereafter, under the code theory, the court should apply the
proper judgment to the facts, whichever alternative is proved.
The demand for judgment is simply the pleader's suggestion to
the court. 3  And since it was argued above that pleading in the
alternative should be permitted without express court rule, so
likewise it is believed that demands for judgment in the alter-
native should be considered proper under the ordinary codes.
Pac. 914; but see Beranek -v. Beranek, supra note 115; Connecticut, cupra
note 108.
12- Cf. N. Y. C. P. A., 1921, sec. 211: "All persons may be joined as
defendants against whom the right to any relief is alleged to exist, whether
jointly, severally or in the alternative." See also supra note 78.
130 See discussion supra text, p. 278 et seq.
11 Cf. cases cited, supra note 83.
132 Conn. Prac. Bk. (1922) p. 282, sec. 17; N. J. Prac. Act, 1912, Rule
37; Eng. Jud. Act, Order 20, Rule 6; Craft Refrigerath, g Mach. Co. v.
Quinnipiac Brewing Co. (1893) 63 Conn. 551, 29 At. 76.
33 So held in Hiatt v. Parkcr (1883) 29 Kan. 765; Lillard v. Brcaini
& Brand (1891) 91 Ky. 511, 16 S. W. 349. Contra: Thames v. Clc.i (1919,
Tex. Civ. App.) 208 S. W. 195 (not unless alternative counts are set out);
Pensenneau v. Pensenmeau (1855) 22 Mo. 27 (a state where pleading in
the alternative is expressly authorized by the code); supra note 82. Cf.
Durant v. Gardner (1860, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 19 How. Pr. 94. Cf. the quite
usual prayer for specific performance or damages. Barlow v. Scott (1861)
24 N. Y. 40; Konnerup v. Frandsen (1894) 8 Wash. 551, 3G Pac. 493. So
in general equitable relief may be prayed in the alternative. Bailey v.
Chilton (1921) 106 Neb. 795, 184 N. W. 939; Worth v. Kniklzcrbochcr Tru.-t
Co. (1910) 152 N. C. 242, 67 S. E. 590; Reiger v. Turley (1911) 151 Iowa,
491, 131 N. W. 866; Keigwin, supra note 70, at 65.
